A History of the 5th Tennessee Cavalry, CSA

What you are about to read is a project I undertook as a benefit for my Kincaid relatives whose ancestors fought with the 5th Tennessee Cavalry. The lack of available information on this unit seemed to make the effort worthwhile, but I still had the impression it would be a small pamphlet sized affair. What is produced here, is far beyond my initial goal, being much longer than I supposed it would be. Therefore, there are a few things the reader should be aware of first.

Once I realized that I would find more information than originally envisioned, I decided to write something that would be interesting for all Civil War buffs, and not just my family. However, I will explain my use of sources, since this was not written in a manner for formal publication. Most everything in this history came from either the Official Records of the War of Rebellion, or William G. Allen's personal memoir, Reminiscences of William G. Allen. I tried to cite either the O. R., or Allen, whenever I found something that I only found in those sources. I also made extensive use of some other sources, which were not necessarily cited, to help clarify many events that are not self-apparent from Allen's writing or the Official Records. In addition, these sources were used to help place all of the events within their proper Civil War context. The most significant of these sources are found at the end.

Being such an integral part of this history, I should take a moment to explain Mr. Allen's role. William G. Allen was the Regimental Adjutant for the Fifth. He also attained the rank of Major. Mr. Allen began writing his memoirs for a series of articles published in the Dayton Herald, and the Confederate Veteran in 1911, 1912, and 1918. These articles were combined very nicely for publication in a single volume by Betty Broyles and Carl Campbell, for the Rhea County Historical and Genealogical Society.

The following information is very important for those who have read Mr. Allen's memoirs, or those who would like to read them. I made every effort to verify his version of principle events, and found that he did make many mistakes. Most of these mistakes were more a matter of when and where an event occurred, not if the event occurred. Where I could not verify either way, I took his word for it. In some cases he told very interesting stories, but their time and place were totally undecipherable. Unable to determine where they fit, I decided not to use those stories in my history, as my history is an attempt to follow a proper timeline. Furthermore, not being a polished writer, combined with his elderly age at the time, he produced some very confusing passages. Hopefully, reading my history will clarify some of Mr. Allen's own narrative. That being said, his memoir is still the best personal narrative I know of concerning the 5th Tennessee Cavalry, and I happily recommend it to everyone.

Lastly, the reader will note that this history contains a fair amount of material that does not directly address the 5th Tennessee Cavalry. There are many regimental histories available to the public, but the vast majority of these are antiseptic in their delivery. That is, they do not put the regiment within their historical context. It is only a matter of fact that a unit fought at Perryville, Murfreesboro, or Chickamauga, and does not mean anything to the reader unless one is well versed in Civil War history. But what if your ancestor fought at Pleasant Hill, Port Gibson, or Haynes Bluff? Does that mean anything to you? Not unless you are the most devoted Civil War buff.

For most Americans who have relatives that fought in the Civil War, regimental histories do not do justice to what they went through, because the reader doesn't understand the surrounding implications. That is why this history of the 5th Tennessee Cavalry is told from within the larger framework: as a regiment within a brigade, a brigade within a division, a division within a corps, a corps within an army. And not just any army, the Army of Tennessee.

On the other hand, I did not include some information that is basic for all regiments, such as a roster. It was not my intention to merely copy information that can be found in other sources, or to take the place of those already written, but to enhance that information through narration. A good comprehensive roster of the 5th can be found on the internet. A roster of those who surrendered in North Carolina is included in Allen's memoirs, and I believe is a trustworthy account.

Early in 1862, George W. McKenzie was a Lieutenant Colonel, and James M. Kincaid was a captain in Roger's 1st East TN Cavalry. Apparently, the other Kincaid brothers were not members yet. This unit spent all of 1862 in the southern counties of Kentucky, Virginia, and in East Tennessee. They were involved in numerous small fights: Williamsburg, Ky; Big Creek Gap (several); Cumberland Gap (several); Goose Creek, Crab Orchard, Big Hill, to name a few, leading up to the Battle of Perryville.

On the morning of March 14th, 1862, while the 1st was guarding the Cumberland Mountain passes, two companies of the 1st (not commanded by Kincaid or McKenzie) were surprised by a night march of the 49th Indiana. Besides several casualties, and prisoners taken, the regimental standard was captured in the brief fight. This lead to a scathing report from Maj. General Kirby Smith, who expressed a low opinion of East Tennessee troops, due to the Pro-Union sentiment in that part of Tennessee.

After Confederate authorities inspected the situation, the 1st was reorganized as McLin's 2nd Tennessee Cavalry Regiment, less two companies. This reduced strength caused the unit to be referred to in some records as the 2nd Battalion, but to avoid confusion with another 2nd Battalion they were also called the 13th Battalion. The unit was brigaded under Colonel A. B. Allston as McLin's 2nd Tennessee Cavalry in June of '62. In July of '62 four companies were again surprised at Wallace's Crossroads near Clinton, Tn, and General Kirby Smith decided to replace Colonel McLin with Colonel McKenzie as the battalion commander. (McLin continued to lend honorable service until killed by a bushwhacker)

I should say that the preceding synopsis came from the often-used volume “Tennesseans in the Civil War”, the internet version from the TNGENWEB site, and it is in conflict with the memoirs of William G. Allen, Adjutant of the 5th Tenn. Cavalry. Mr. Allen's memoirs are an invaluable source of information, but as he was about 75 years old when he began the series, and I am interested in trying to provide a factual history, I have double-checked some of his assertions against the Official Records. In doing so, I often found nothing to prove or disprove his statements, but on occasion the O.R. is in conflict.

The most important issues of note would be when the unit was actually designated as the 5th, and whether or not the unit participated in the battle of Perryville. Allen asserts consistently that the 5th was organized in March of '62 with McKenzie as its commander. According to “Tennesseans in the Civil War” it was not so until December, when the 13th Battalion was brought up to Regimental strength. The answer may be that both are wrong and right. From June to about August the O.R. list the unit as the 2nd (McLin's) Tenn Cavalry. However, the OR is not the “end all, be all” of Civil War records. That is why it is important to have memoirs from participants like Mr. Allen. In fact, the order appointing W. G. Allen as regimental Adjutant did indeed come from Colonel McKenzie as commander of the 5th Regiment of Tennessee Cavalry, on Sept. 20, 1862.

Therefore, I offer the following explanation. The unit was reorganized in March of '62 as Allen concurs, but it was initially designated the 2nd Tn. There was already another 2nd Tn, but the two units were in different departments. Discovering this, somebody probably did start referencing the 2nd as the 5th, but not officially. Then when the regiment was reduced to a battalion, members of the unit still referred to themselves as the 5th Regiment, possibly assuming the situation was temporary-which it was. To Confederate authorities, the unit was not officially a regiment again until the missing companies were replaced in December, at which time they began being referred to in the records as the 5th Regiment. Until that time, I believe the military hierarchy probably referred to the unit as the 2nd Tn and the 13th Battalion, while members thought of themselves as the 5th.

Mr. Allen also claims that the first major battle the 5th (he used the term, 5th) participated in was at Perryville. There is no Order of Battle that list either the 2nd, 13th, or the 5th as participating at Perryville. There is no report or communication in the O.R. of their participation in the battle. However, it was possible to be there, and not be recognized in the Official Records. First of all, the O.R. for Perryville is very incomplete. Secondly, the 5th (as I will call it) was not part of Bragg's army, but was assigned to Kirby Smith's Department of East Tennessee, brigaded under Allston, and Smith was ordered to have his units cooperate with Bragg in the Kentucky invasion. Since Mr. Allen recalls very specific and seemingly clear information about the events surrounding their part at Perryville, I believe they were there.

According to Allen, they were ordered to Harrodsburg, Ky, on the 7th-the day before the battle. Harrodsburg was a major gathering point for Bragg. On the 8th they were sent to the right flank of General John Wharton's cavalry brigade, which was itself on the extreme right of the army, covering the right of Maney's infantry brigade. When Maney launched his attack on Buell's left, Wharton was ordered forward to his support. The attack was very successful early, but eventually ran into a line strong line of artillery and rallied Federal infantry. At this time General Wharton was ordered to make a second attack, which he refused to do, over open ground in front of all that artillery. Thus, the battle ended without a clear victory.

No map I've seen shows any units beyond the right of Wharton's cavalry. However, Allen's account gives the impression that they were actually assigned under the command of Wharton, even though Allston was their brigade commander. If so, then his brief reference to participating in an attack is possible. Accordingly, Colonel Allston was killed during this time, and lends credence to the fact that his men did participate in some of the fighting. The most plausible scenario is that Allston's brigade arrived ahead of Smith, and was temporarily assigned to Wharton, while the remainder of Smith's command was on its way to join Bragg. However, the battle ended before they could get there. What is certain, is that the 5th served as rearguard for Bragg's army during its retreat into East Tennessee, and Colonel McKenzie was temporarily brigade commander. At Stanford they sat on their horses, with sabers drawn, all night while Bragg's army moved south behind them. By the time they returned to Tennessee the 5th had lost 61 men. (Allen)

In late 1862 General Braxton Bragg ordered two more companies organized for the 13th Battalion. At the same time, Captain James M. Kincaid returned to Roane County and recruited family members, among others. The addition of these two companies, and the new recruits, raised the battalion to regimental strength, and it was officially designated the 5th TN Cavalry in December of 1862. At the time, the 5th was on independent duty in Scott County, Tennessee.

The early months of 1863 found the 5th unattached (not part of an army command system), and mainly patrolling in East Tennessee, especially along the Kentucky border. The war in East Tennessee was essentially a contest of small units constantly roaming country roads looking for each other. Skirmishing, raid and counter-raid, and spying were the activities for these troops. Fragments of the 5th were sent into the mountains to hunt down bushwhackers.

Though smaller in scale, the contest there was no less heated than in other parts of the war. East Tennessee counties had voted overwhelmingly not to secede-though, to no avail. However, there were plenty of rebels to be found there as evidenced by the Kincaids and other families. People who had been neighbors before now found themselves as mortal enemies. Towns would be controlled by the Confederates one day, the Union on the next, only to have Confederates retake the town, and so on, until late in the war. While this was happening, much private property was being violated whether on purpose or by accident. This created deep animosity among the populace. Men on both sides were in constant fear for their homes and families.

The above title is a misnomer since there were many, almost daily, cavalry raids into Kentucky. The term “raid” might even be an improper term considering that the Confederacy viewed Kentucky as their own, invaded by the North. There were no clear-cut lines here. The territory in the Western Theater was so large in its breadth that it was impossible for either side to stop each other from moving into, and through, supposedly occupied territory-at least for small units. Therefore, the following is an account of only two of the most significant of the several “raids.”

In February of 1863, the brigade that was being commanded by Col. J. S. Scott was assigned to Colonel John Pegram's (Scott was commander of the 1st La, which was part on the brigade). The brigade consisted of the 1st LA, 2nd TN (Ashby's), 5th TN, and the 16th TN Battalion. In late March Pegram was ordered on a raid into Kentucky to round up cattle for Bragg's army. The 5th moved from Big Creek Gap, while the other regiments-now including the 6th Georgia-moved through Cumberland Gap and Emory Gap. Their route was to be through Williamsburg, London, Danville, and back to Tennessee with all the cattle they could drive along the way. Things got hot early, when about one mile north of Williamsburg the 5th was ambushed. The road they were on had to pass through a deep gulch where an Ohio regiment posted itself behind logs, and rocks along the cliffs on either side. The opening salvo hit the column like the kick from a mule and killed 10 men straight off. The 5th rallied, charged through the pass, and routed the enemy.

Moving on to London they captured a train of supplies. Shortly after, they met up with Pegram and the other regiments, and marched for Danville. On a wet and dreary night near Danville they accidentally stumbled into Union General Fry's forces guarding the town. A confusing night fight ensued, and a few men of the 16th and the 5th were captured. The next morning Pegram sent a battalion, charging in column formation, against Fry's line. The column drove right through, sending the Federals flying in panic, but they soon had to call it off when they ran into a large camp of new recruits, Union Camp Nelson, under Union General Nelson.

Pegram pulled back the attackers, and began a plan to make the Federals think they were besieged by a much larger force. The Federals hunkered down, expecting an attack all the time. For several days about 200 men marched back and forth, in and out of sight of the Union lines, while the balance of the brigade roamed the countryside for cattle. The ruse was continued while the cattle was herded toward Tennessee, but when the Federals caught on they began the chase in two columns under Nelson and Fry. The cattle being difficult to move, allowed Nelson to strike at the 6th Georgia in route, but Colonel Hart managed to survive the scare and got away with his herd. Pegram also had to make a defensive stand near Somerset against General Fry, literally fighting as their cattle swam the Cumberland River. Though the majority of his command escaped, several men and cattle were captured. This event capped a mounting displeasure with Pegram by his subordinate commanders-Colonel Scott one of them.

During the months of May and June, the 5th was back patrolling the same roads they had used on their cattle raid (between Williamsburg, Somerset and London, KY); watching and reporting the activities of Union General Burnside as he prepared to invade East Tennessee. In July the audacious John Hunt Morgan was making one of his famous raids, but ran into some serious trouble. Hoping to provide some relief for Morgan's column, Col. Scott led his brigade on another raid into Southeastern Kentucky. The scene of this activity was along what is now I75 running from Knoxville, TN, to Lexington, KY. Late in July Scott left Tennessee, and on the 26th he skirmished at London, KY. The next day they skirmished again at Rogersville.

On the morning of the 28th, he was approaching Richmond, KY, and found about 1200 men consisting of the 112th IL Mounted infantry, 2nd OH, 7th OH, and some Union Kentucky Cavalry, blocking his way. After a serious battle with vicious hand to hand fighting, slashing sabers, and pistols firing point blank, Scott drove the Union forces through the town, capturing many men and supplies.

Moving on to Winchester, about 10 miles east of Lexington, Scott sent the 5th on ahead to Paris, KY, just northeast of Lexington, to destroy a bridge there. Scott was now deep in enemy held territory, with the 5th even deeper, when he heard of Morgan's capture. He soon learned that the forces that were previously chasing Morgan, were now being concentrated in Lexington by railroad. In desperate need of fresh horses, Scott fell back on the town of Irvine, where he hoped to surprise the Union 14th KY cavalry. Before he could do so, he received word that Union forces from Lexington were pushing back his rearguard units. This threatened to cut the 5th off from the main command, which was moving away from them, so Col. McKenzie was ordered to retreat southeast toward Mount Sterling. Scott's goal was to make for the Cumberland Mountain passes where he could slip his men through while using the passes to hold off his pursuers.

Reaching Irvine on July 30th, Scott routed the Union force there. With little time to rest, the pursuing Yankees appeared on the opposite bank of the Kentucky River. Leaving another force as a rearguard, Scott made a drastic turn to the west, and headed for the Richmond road again. He did not take the same route home, but continued on in the direction of Danville. On the July 31st he was again attacked from the rear, but without affect. That afternoon, another attack on his rearguard resulted in the capture of many prisoners by the Union force. In front of him, Scott came to the town of Stanford where he chased off troops guarding 200 wagons. The wagons were destroyed before he finally rested the men.

Union forces were able to concentrate very quickly at a time when Scott had several detachments out. Thus, many of these men were not able to unite with the main force, and had to make their way back as best as they could. McKenzie's 5th was one of these units. As stated, after leaving Paris the 5th headed for Mount Sterling, but Union forces were still too active to regain the Richmond Road. McKenzie moved farther southeast, into the foothills of Pine Mountain, before he could turn south. Moving through Hazard, they crossed Pine Mountain into Virginia. They were finally safe, but they weren't home yet, and the final leg would be through rough mountainous terrain. The following is McKenzie's brief report:

COLONEL: On July 29, at Winchester , Ky., in obedience to your orders to make a demonstration on Paris, Ky., I arrived there about 4p.m., charged the enemy's pickets, driving them to the main body. Cannot state positively their strength, but learned from reliable citizens that they were at least 3,000 strong. Subsequently we were informed heavy re-enforcements had arrived, the entire of whom, after my departure, fell into the pursuit of yourself.

About this time I received orders from you to form a junction between Irvine and Winchester, but found it utterly impracticable, as I found it from my own observation, likewise by couriers from you, impossible to join the brigade. I thence proceeded to secure the safety of my command, which consisted of my own regiment, and 100 others belonging to the brigade, retreating via the route herein explained: Passed out between Mount Sterling and Booneville, through Jackson, Hazard, Mount Pleasant, and Fulkerson's Gap, into Powell's Valley, where I left my command proceeding leisurely in their course to Concord, Tenn. From the time I left Paris, Ky., I met with no impediment or enemy, with the exception of a Federal scouting party of about 50 men, which were routed without difficulty.

A few weeks after Scott's Kentucky raid, the 5th was designated as the rearguard for General Simon Buckner's (commander in East Tenn. Dept. at the time) troops as he was forced to evacuate East Tennessee. This movement was necessitated by the retreat of Braxton Bragg's army from Middle Tennessee, and the advance of General Burnside's 20,000 man force into East Tennessee. At Loudon, TN, on the Tennessee River, they were attacked by Burnside's advance unit before they could cross. Some of the men held off the Federals while others prepared the bridge for burning. Finally, having fired their pistols until out of ammunition, some of the defenders threw their guns at the advancing Yankees, before they scampered over the bridge. While they tried to ignite the bridge, a Union battery opened fire killing one of the men. In spite of this harassment, they completed the job and continued their retreat.

Bragg's Army of Tennessee retreated beyond Chattanooga, and through the gaps of Missionary Ridge before stopping. On the 6th of September the regiment was marching to meet Bragg's army at Ringgold, by way of a narrow road running between a creek on one side and cliffs on the other. Possibly due to an overflowing creek, a pond several feet deep had formed across the road, and became a quagmire of mud as people and horses passed through it. On the other side the column became thinly stretched, while those passing through this mud pit were bunched up. The thin forefront of the column came out of the pass to a crossroad where a regiment of Union General Wilder's cavalry (actually mounted infantry armed with repeating rifles) charged into the column from a side road. The 5th was cut in half. The rear half of the regiment had to retreat up the slop of White Oak Mountain, and meet McKenzie on the other side. Some of the Federals got bogged down in the mud themselves in chasing the rear companies, and were captured. They spent every day of the next two weeks skirmishing with Wilder's brigade, losing 17 men.

In this near fiasco, Adjutant W. G. Allen says his horse was wounded and he finish his escape on foot. Later that evening, he and a man named William Runyans went back to look for his horse. They suddenly found themselves in the middle of a Union picket, who demanded their surrender. The two men ran, but Runyans was hit in the leg by a ball that broke his femur bone. Allen was also hit in the back of his thigh. Allen could still travel, but Runyans was too heavy to carry so he said for Allen to get away, because he believed he would be recaptured the next day. That night the doctor pulled a ball out of Allen's leg.

Though J. M. Kincaid was listed as the captain of company B, this may not have been the same company B he commanded in the 5th regiment. I have not found any hard evidence as to whether these two companies were robbed from the 5th, formed of new recruits, or a combination of both. My own suspicion is that they were a combination of both. In the first place, A and B would be the natural designations for a new unit containing only two companies. In the second place, I have compared a roster of Co. B from the 5th, with a roster of Kincaid's company as it existed under Welcker, and find that some of the names are the same, some are not. In fact, Captain Kincaid is the only Kincaid on his roster! Furthermore, history states that this unit was also known as Welcker's Silver Grays, due to the age of its membership.

The formation of Welcker's Battalion, operating independently, came at a most conspicuous time. Why Confederate authorities would do such a thing when Bragg was anxious to consolidate all available men for what he knew would be a desperate struggle against Rosecran's Army, speaks volumes about the sentiments of soldiers from East Tennessee. I believe that due to the severe animosity Confederates faced from Unionist there, several men were loathe to leave their families behind while they retreated with the main army. In fact, I suspect that they downright refused to leave, and that their objections were so understood by Confederate authorities that Welcker's unit was the only way to resolve the situation to the satisfaction of all.

Why did the other Kincaids not follow their brother? Assuming that the roster I have is correct, and given the number of Kincaids serving at that time, the only conclusion I can make is that they stayed with the 5th. As it turns out, however, their oldest brother may have been chosen for this assignment out of practical considerations. According to a descendent of J. M. Kincaid, he was suffering from rheumatism, an affliction that forced his resignation. Possibly, authorities recognized that he would not be able to withstand the rigors of a long campaign, and having shown himself a good recruiter for the East Tennessee area in the past, he was seen as a sensible choice.

Kincaid's claim of rheumatism is a story in itself, and suggest the possibility of intrigue. According to the same source, as a result of his affliction, Capt. Kincaid resigned his position on July 29, 1863. His resignation was accepted, and he was formally discharged in August. On Dec. 12, 1863 he was arrested as a Confederate soldier by Union troops, at his home in Roane County, supposedly turned in by a neighbor for a reward. Apparently he produced his official discharge papers, but this defense was ignored, and he eventually ended up in Camp Chase, OH, where he died of chronic diarrhea not long before the end of the war.

The mystery lies in the fact that the date of his resignation is in direct conflict with other records. For instance, Welcker's Battalion was organized on Aug. 7, 1863, with Kincaid as captain of company B. This is the same month that his resignation was supposedly accepted! Lest you think that he was temporarily assigned until his discharge came through, I offer this piece of evidence I found in the Official Records. On Nov. 22, 1863, Maj-General Wheeler issued Special Orders No. 101, as such:

The above record clearly states that Kincaid was in active service well into November. Next, consider that even after producing supposed proof that he was no longer a soldier, he was arrested anyway. At the time, J. M. Kincaid was at least 47 to 49 years old. That his age and proof of discharge was not enough to save him is an indication to me that the Federals had their own reasons to believe that Mr. Kincaid was not as innocent as he claimed to be.

Could it be that the claim of rheumatism, letter of resignation, and discharge, was all a calculated ruse in an attempt to protect him while he operated behind enemy lines? It would be fun to think so. From the evidence presented, one has to wonder. Otherwise, one or more of the conflicting records would have to be determined as incorrect to avoid the controversy. More than likely, the true story is that his rheumatism and subsequent resignation were genuine, but Captain Kincaid obviously continued to support the Confederacy with more than morale fortitude, and this eventually got him in trouble. Either way, these events add a touch of mystery to the Kincaid saga.

I have found 2 pieces of hard evidence from the Official Records to indicate where Welcker was operating during the battles near Chattanooga. The one I have already produced above. Also, from “Stamp Creek” on October 27, 1863, Welcker sent an order to a “Colonel Hunt.” In this correspondence he indicates that he is operating near Loudon, TN, on the south bank of the Tennessee River, and in a position to guard the crossing from Kingston or Knoxville. Once again, bushwhacking is a subject of concern, and indicates the kind of guerrilla warfare that went on in East Tennessee. Here is how Welcker described it:

“I also sent a scout up the river as far as Paint rock ferry, between Kingston and Loudon, who learned certainly that quite a number of the enemy, principally renegades, are crossing their horses over at that place and returning with their guns on foot, no doubt to bushwhack and rob on Paint Creek and Stockton's Creeks . . . It would be well to look after those bushwhackers in force, and picket all the cross-roads, and in that way some may be captured.”

Sometime during Bragg's preparations to meet Rosecrans, the 5th was assigned thus: Forrest's Corps > Pegram's Division > Scott's Brigade. The actual makeup of Scott's Brigade was the 10th Conf., a detachment from John H. Morgan under Lt. Col. R. M. Martin, 1st La, 2nd Tn, 5th Tn, and Robinson's Louisiana battery (Another source listed the 12th and 16th Tn Btns, but according to the OR, this is incorrect). As already stated, their first action in this new organization was at Ringgold, Ga., on Sept. 11th. Ringgold was on the army's right flank. Another source says they were in a skirmish at Summervile the previous day, but this is not true. Summerville is on the opposite flank from Ringgold; the area assigned to Wheeler's cavalry. Perhaps the claim may stem from the organization I just described above. This organization was to some degree a paper tiger, and never intended to be permanent. It is true that on the 10th, Forrest was ordered to Summerville with all the men he could bring. He was to join Wheeler there and stop a serious threat to the army's left, southern flank. However, Forrest did not take his whole command, but left Pegram's two brigades, Davidson and Scott near Chattanooga, where on that same day they skirmished near Graysville.

The next day, elements of Crittendon's Corps advanced again from Graysville toward Ringgold. Scott's Brigade was forced back upon Dalton, Ga., where they made a stand for two hours. With the balance of Forrest's command on the assignment previously described, the brigade made a slow retreat with constant skirmishing until they reached Tunnel Hill about nightfall. Here they reunited with Forrest.

On the 12th, perhaps realizing they had advanced beyond their own support, the enemy retired. Pegram's Division followed, snapping at their heels all the way before this movement culminated in a two hour stand by Wilder's Lightening Brigade of mounted unfantry at Leet's Tan-yard near the LaFayette road. They remained in this position throughout the 13th.

On the 14th Forrest ordered Scott to return to Ringgold. On the night of the 15th, the 5th saddled up and charged into Wilder's camp, scattering his men and capturing some badly need horses. (Allen) Not until the 17th did the enemy advance upon that place again. They were repulsed, but instead of falling back on Graysville, encamped a few miles from Ringgold. At midnight of the 17th/18th, Scott repeated the previous foray of the 15th with 4 companies of the 2nd Tn, and one piece of artillery, raiding a Union camp, and causing much confusion. On the 18th Scott was ordered to a place called Red House Bridge, also known as Reed's Bridge.

Bragg thought he saw an opportunity to move north and turn the left of Rosecrans' line, which would have cut him off from Chattanooga, but could not get the proper support from his generals. This effort began a series of northward moves by both sides-Bragg trying to get across Rosecrans' northern flank, and Rosecrans trying to stop him-until Bragg's army was concentrated in an area southeast of Rossville, and on the east bank of Chickamauga Creek.

The stage was now set for the Battle of Chickamauga. Bragg was determined to force a crossing of the Chickamauga at about three main points, but especially at Reed's Bridge on the north end of the line. On the 18th the 5th Tenn took and held this bridge with the loss of one man until the infantry came to cross. When this was accomplished they were ordered to Leet's Tan Yard to guard the right from any surprise moves out of Chattanooga.

Here, on the right (north), Bushrod Johnson's Division, supported by Forrest on his right, was to make the attack. Col. Robert Minty's Cavalry Brigade effectively withstood their efforts for most of the day. Finally the Confederates broke out from their bridgehead when John Bell Hood's Division added its weight. With two infantry divisions crowding over the narrow bridge, Forrest's men were rendered ineffective, and had to ride upstream and find a ford to cross.

Thus by nightfall of the 18th, Johnson and Hood were over the Chickamauga. Forrest was bivouacked just behind Hood. Scott's Brigade was even farther north on the extreme right, and still on the east side of the Chickamauga guarding the Ringgold Bridge. During the night Bragg pushed over more troops at other points as he prepared for the next day.

On the morning of the 19th, Forrest was ordered to advance farther up the Reed's Bridge Road, covering the right of an infantry attack meant to fold back Rosecrans' left. With only one brigade of Pegram's Division on hand (his other division, Armstrong's, was on loan to General Polk) he ordered Scott's Brigade to return to his right. He then proceeded up the Reed's Bridge Road with what he had, until he ran into a strong force of infantry. Apparently this was not expected as Bragg believed his right was beyond Rosecrans' main force. However, Rosecrans-suspecting Bragg's intentions-also shifted Thomas' Corps to the north until his left was now beyond the Confederate right. As a result, the following movements were more from a matter of necessity rather than by design.

Forrest regrouped and called for infantry. Wilson's brigade arrived and together they drove the enemy back until again discovering superior forces. The addition of Ector's brigade initially brought success, but as it turned out, Forrest-who had assumed command of the infantry also-was still under strength for the task ahead. Even the arrival of Cheatham's entire division could not tilt the balance.

Earlier, Scott had started back to Forrest, but before he got there he evidently ran into elements of Granger's Reserve Corps (which was stationed unexpectedly on Rosecran's extreme left, between Rosecrans' army and Chattanooga), and possibly Minty's cavalry brigade, blocking the Ringgold to Rossville Road. Scott ordered the 2nd Tennessee to charge. The head of their column withered under the Union fire. Dead men and horses piled up on the road so that the charge was bottlenecked to a stop. The Second's momentum was lost, so Scott then ordered the 5th forward. They had to pass to the right of the 2nd, the road being congested, and through a pine thicket. When they emerged, they were on the enemy's flank. They charged and drove the enemy back about a half-mile. At this point Scott formed the entire brigade in line of battle. Several successive charges drove the enemy line back on their own reinforcements and a battery of artillery, making them stronger as they retreated.

The battle came to a stalemate, and continued this way for some 3 to 4 hours. They could hear General Pegram's artillery engaging the Union infantry, while the Union battery opposite Scott was doing some damage of its own. McKenzie ordered Companies A and D of the 5th to charge and take the battery. In this charge 4 officers and half the companies were cut down. The remainder reached the battery's position just in time to see it drawn away. Just then a line of infantry rose from behind the ridge and unleashed a volley that was too high.

The attackers tried to take cover in a ravine behind a nearby house. Diving into this shelter from the storm they were surprised to find it was already occupied by more Union infantry. No doubt there was a second or two of astonishment as the two forces found themselves unexpectedly facing each other at point blank range. William Allen says he fired his pistol, and the Yankees returned fire. Seven Confederates fell, while Allen was hit three times. Scampering out of this death trap, they began a full retreat back to their line. The Union battery had unlimbered again, and now poured a round of grape and canister at the fleeing group. More men fell. As they entered the woods where their comrades waited, a solid shot fell a pine tree just in front of them, causing more havoc. Few men of these two companies made it back unscathed. Every commissioned officer was dead or wounded. Finally, out of ammunition, Scott was forced to retreat back across the Chickamauga, where he held the Ringgold bridge through the 20th.

By the end of the 19th, the troops under Forrest's command were basically in the same position as before, though slightly more to the north of Reed's Bridge Road, and just hanging on to the infantry's right flank. For the most part they spent the day fighting dismounted. In this, Confederate cavalry was at a disadvantage compared to their counterpart. Much of the Union cavalry, especially in the west, were actually mounted infantry, while Forrest and Wheeler's men tended to be more suited to the style of light cavalry. In weaponry, there was no comparison. The North was starting to arm their cavalry with the Spencer repeating rifle, while the Confederates were still using single shot carbines, shotguns, sabers, and Bowie knives. Actually, either side could have an advantage over the other depending on the situation, but in battles like Chickamauga, slugging affairs in rough terrain, Union cavalry was probably more comfortable.

The next day saw vicious fighting, and the Confederates finally turned the Union left. The division of Confederate General John C. Breckenridge attacked the very end of Rosecrans' left, where only a newly arrived brigade was posted. This might have carried the day if not for a courageous stand by George H. Thomas' Corps (for which he received the title, “The Rock of Chickamauga”). However, with Thomas' line folded back perpendicular to itself, Forrest with Armstrong's Division and Pegram's one brigade in reserve moved forward like passing through an open door. Reaching Rosecrans' right rear, Forrest captured a hospital camp and several prisoners. Granger's Reserve Corps came to the rescue driving Forrest back. This timely counter-attack by Granger saved the LaFayette Road, which was a major route back to Chattanooga.

Though the Confederates seemed to have the better of it for most of the previous day and a half, it was a mistake that finally dropped the hammer. Erroneously believing that Brannan's Division had gone to the aid of Thomas, who was then being hard pressed to save the collapsing left, Rosecrans ordered Woods Division to fill a gap that wasn't there. In carrying out this order Woods created a 600 yard gap just when Confederate General Longstreet was launching his attack on the center. The result was as real as predictable. The Union right and center lost cohesion as the Rebels poured in.

Falling back, these disorganized divisions made another stand, forming a horseshoe line on Snodgrass Hill, but this was only to allow some hope of escape to the rocky Missionary Ridge, directly behind them. This was the exact situation where cavalry, Confederate cavalry in this case, could be unleashed to exploit the enemy's disorganized state. Unfortunately for Bragg, the Union cavalry, especially Minty and Wilder's brigades, who constantly raced from one needed spot to another, performed admirably in this battle. (The above account is a combination of W. G. Allen's, The Official Records, and several books on the battle. If you read his series, Mr. Allen apparently confused some of the geography and place names from the 18th and the 19th, but I believe the micro details are genuine.)

Scott's Brigade did not participate in the main theatre on the 20th, but was being shadowed by Minty's brigade (Minty moved to the far Union left after he also realized this battle belonged to the infantry). Scott was in a position to cut off some of the escape routes, but before he could advance Minty attacked him. This was an excellent move on Minty's part, and effectively denied Scott any momentum.

What is known as the Battle of Chickamauga was over. Scott reported his losses at 10 killed, 39 wounded, and 15 horses killed. The 5th Tn accounted for 16 of these at 2 killed and 14 wounded. In his official report, Scott claimed to have inflicted over 100 casualties on the 19th alone (given his own casualties, I am certain this is an exaggeration), captured 34 prisoners, and 75 rifles.

The battle of Chickamauga may have been over, but not the campaign for Tennessee. It was in times like this, when the armies disengage and the infantry stand down, that the cavalry becomes most active. On the 21st, after the retreat to Chattanooga began in earnest through the gaps in Missionary Ridge, Forrest was able to take the LaFayette Road and capture many prisoners. On the 22nd, Scott's Brigade crossed Missionary Ridge and descended into the valley about three miles from Chattanooga. According to Scott, he met and drove the 59th Ohio Infantry into a line of entrenchments and rifle pits that were built around Chattanooga. There he again assaulted them, and gained the first line of defense before darkness, and General Pegram compelled him to return to Missionary Ridge.

While Rosecrans' army filed into Chattanooga proper, Bragg occupied Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain. From this position it was like looking down into a bowl-at least one side of it. Rosecrans had the Confederates on the heights above him, and the Tennessee River behind him. With the main Union force effectively pinned down, the cavalry was once again liberated with an eye towards mischief.

For the next several days the 5th would ride and fight under both Forrest and Wheeler without interruption. Concerned about Union forces in East Tennessee being on Bragg's right rear, Forrest left the right flank on Sept. 25th and drove all enemy units encountered as far back as Philadelphia, Tennessee. The 5th was detached from its own brigade for this expedition.

Upon his return, Forrest was ordered to send Davidson's (who now had Pegram's division command, and therefore the 5th) and one of Armstrong's brigades to Wheeler's command. Wheeler with his own troops, and the newly arrived brigades from Forrest, crossed the Tennessee River late on Sept. 30th (could have been Oct. 1st.) at Cottonport to begin a long raid on the lines of communication for Rosecrans' army. It is hard to know exactly who was with him for the initial move. Forrest' troopers, and their horses, were blown from their earlier raid into East Tenn., and came directly to Wheeler without rest. Realizing that they would not be able to keep up, Wheeler ordered the worst horses-and presumably the men that rode them-left behind. (Who these men were is unknown, and whether they ever joined the command is doubtful.) The subsequent depletion hit each of Forrest's brigades somewhat evenly, so that while on paper they were three brigades, in actual strength they were more like a brigade and a half. As a unit, the 5th was there.

After crossing the river, Wheeler crossed Walden's Ridge which loomed before him. The 5th went by way of Pikeville, using an old Indian trail. On the other side they turned southwest down the Sequatchie River Valley. After about 10 miles Wheeler divided the command, sending one part northwest toward McMinnville (incl. Davidson's Div.), while he led 1,500 men, including the 5th, against Rosecrans' immediate supply line. At Anderson's Crossroads Wheeler drove off the men guarding an 800-wagon train loaded with supplies. The good mules and horses were taken, and the wagons burned. As they left this scene toward night, they were attacked by Union cavalry, but were not damaged.

During the night, he crossed the Cumberland Mountains and caught up to the units he had sent on ahead (Wharton, Davidson's Div.). On Oct. 3rd they stood in line of battle before the town of McMinnville, and demanded its surrender. Major Patterson, 600 men of the 4th TN Union Infantry and 10th WI Volunteers, and millions of dollars worth of provisions and munitions were shortly captured. The balance of that day and night was spent destroying a locomotive and its cars, and a bridge over Hickory Creek.

It should be noted here, that Major Patterson was less than pleased by the conduct of his captors. Apparently, the prisoners were stripped of everything the hungry and ill clad Rebels could use, and all this while Wheeler and his subordinates looked on unconcerned. Patterson protested, but was told that the matter was out of their control. Then to Patterson's further dismay, Wheeler sent them “outside of his immediate lines, on the Sparta road, a section of country infested with guerrillas, where there was robbing and plundering the paroled prisoners all of the way, even compelling captains to sit down in the middle of the road and pull off their boots.” It was not a gentleman's war in Tennessee.

In the mean time, Union troops were now giving chase. Wheeler marched toward Murfreesboro and stopped long enough to capture the small garrison guarding a railroad bridge over Stones River, and destroyed the bridge as well as the track for three miles. From here he turned south for Shelbyville. Between Murfreesboro and Shelbyville Wheeler's command was generally engaged in destruction of everything useful to the Union army (this would have been about Oct. 6th).

After leaving Shelbyville, Wheeler received word that Union forces were gaining on him. He ordered Davidson's Division to form a rear guard and join the main column if pressed. According to Wheeler, he later changed this, and ordered Davidson to catch up right away. Apparently Davidson either did not receive the second order, or ignored it, for when the enemy approached near Shelbyville he tried to hold them off himself.

This turned out to be an error in judgment, for while he knew they were a “strong force,” (his words) he must not have known their true nature. He first sent in a single battalion, which soon called for reinforcements. Next, Davidson compounded the issue by throwing Scott's Brigade at what turned out to be a superior force of both infantry and cavalry. Fuming over Wheeler's escapades, the angry Federals routed Scott's brigade. (For some reason, Allen states that McKenzie was in command of the brigade here, and that Colonel Montgomery was commanding the 5th. If true, I don't know what happened to Scott.) The 5th got cut off from the rest of the brigade and surrounded. They fought hand to hand as the Federals closed in on them. Finally, Captain John Blythe of Company B (formerly Kincaid's) led a charge that broke the 5th out of their predicament. Now Davidson had to commit Hodges' Brigade in order to save the rest of Scott's brigade. The Yankees shelled Hodges so that he was forced to fall back.

While Hodges was being rudely treated, Davidson was trying to reform Scott's Brigade for a fresh line behind Hodges. He was only partially successful, but the Confederates were now able to employ a leapfrog technique (one line falling behind another) as they retired. Though each new line was able to repulse the Union frontal charges, the Union force was such that they would then extend their lines around the Confederate flanks, forcing them to retire each time with some loss.

By this time Wheeler was aware that something was wrong and went back with a large portion of his force to pull Davidson out of the fire. Near Farmington he found Davidson's shattered division and ordered it to disengage while his main column covered their retreat. This was accomplished well enough to continue their march to the Tennessee River. They made one more raid at Columbia, before crossing the river at Muscle Shoals on Oct. 9th.

In terms of material disruption to Union operations the raid was probably a success. Wheeler also claimed 1,600 prisoners taken, but by his own estimation his battle casualties were about equal to his foe. Considering the propensity of officers to exaggerate the enemy's losses while shedding the best light on their own, this admission is indicative of just how hard pressed he was, especially at Shelbyville. Overall impressions of the expedition were lukewarm at best.

McKenzie lost several men, most of them captured in the affair at Farmington, including the regimental doctor, Dr. Sam Day, who later returned to the regiment. Though not overtly critical, Wheeler's report only gave a gratuitous word of thanks to the men from Forrest' command, while other commands were singled out for praise. This could also be chalked up to natural prejudice for one's own troops. (It was an accepted courtesy for high-ranking officers to avoid overt criticism. They commonly used the tactic of criticism by omission of praise, and the reader was left to read between the lines. This enabled the persons involved to retain the dignity of their position.)

In defense of the three brigades Wheeler borrowed from Forrest, these men had not had a day's rest since well before the Battle of Chickamauga. They had only just returned from one raid to be thrown unawares into an even longer and more dangerous affair. By Wheeler's own admission they were in a haggard condition from the outset. More importantly than the condition of the men, was the condition of their horses. A cavalryman was only as good as his horse, especially when operating deep in enemy territory. Though the worst ones were left behind, those taken could not have been in much better shape.

Including the Chickamauga campaign, by the time Wheeler re-crossed the Tennessee the men had been riding, skirmishing, and downright fighting for about five weeks nonstop. Considering the length and breadth of their operations it is remarkable that they made it back in as good a shape as they did. Yet, if they thought there would be rest at the end of this latest expedition, they were sadly mistaken.

After crossing into Alabama, those brigades on loan from Forrest moved back to Dalton. There followed another confusing rearrangement of command, and the 5th was assigned to Colonel J. J. Morrison (acting as temporary brigade commander), who was assigned to accompany and cooperate with a division of infantry under General Stevenson for a yet another expedition into East Tennessee.

With Bragg besieging Rosecrans in Chattanooga, it would be appropriate to explain the purpose of so many forays-by both sides-into East Tennessee. What is referred to here as East Tennessee, is not so much in the geographic meaning, but rather to describe an area of military operations that ran in a long strip of land just south and east of the Tennessee River. Union forces tended to dominate the northwest bank of the river, while the Confederates guarded the south bank like it was their own back yard-and it was. More importantly, through this strip of land bounded by the river on one side and locally the Smoky Mountains on the other, ran a rail line from Virginia, through Knoxville, Chattanooga, and down to Atlanta. This rail line was Bragg's only real link to Virginia-other than a long and very inconvenient route. The key to East Tennessee was always Knoxville.

To follow these operations one simply has to locate IH75 on a map and follow it from Chattanooga to Knoxville. This was a road well traveled during the war, and what's more, it led directly to Bragg's right flank as he crouched on Missionary Ridge looking down at Chattanooga. As stated before, the area was practically abandoned by the Confederates, and occupied by Burnside prior to Chickamauga. Now that he was victorious, Bragg felt compelled to secure both his flank and reopen the rail line.

For the 5th, there followed a period of several days occupied in patrolling and scouting along the river. At one point in late October, Colonel McKenzie was temporarily serving as brigade commander. On Oct. 31st the 5th was at a place called Pleasant Grove Academy when he was ordered to reorganize the brigade in preparation for another effort to control East Tennessee. The exact chain of command at this time is difficult to decipher. The official return for the Army of Tennessee showed the 5th brigaded with the 4th, 8th, 9th, and 10th TN Cavalry, but no commander is named. Frank C. Armstrong appears to be temporarily division commander. (About this time, most of the cavalry had been permanently assigned to Wheeler, and Forrest was sent west.)

In early November, Bragg ordered Longstreet's Corps (the two divisions brought from Virginia) and most of Wheeler's Cavalry to retake Knoxville. Knoxville was strategically important enough to warrant such a move, but by this time the resources needed were beyond the Confederate's capabilities. The absence of Longstreet's Corps severely weakened Bragg's position on Missionary Ridge, while Union reinforcements were pouring in to Chattanooga. Now that Vicksburg had fallen, much of Grant's army there was being transferred, including Sherman, and Grant himself, who took over in late October. In addition, Hooker's Corps of the Army of the Potomac was transferred from Virginia by rail.

Indications are that the 5th was not part of the Longstreet expedition after all (the tone of Mr. Allen's writing indicates this also). Instead they were assigned to remain with Bragg under General Davidson. On Nov. 19th Brigadier General William Y. C. Humes-newly promoted-was ordered to report to General Davidson at Dalton, Georgia, where he became the 5th's new brigade commander. He was immediately ordered to join Wheeler and Longstreet, but again the 5th remained with Davidson and the main army. (The records do not at all indicate why the 5th would just be assigned to a new command, only to be left with its old command. It makes even less sense when by the end of the year it is back on the roll under Davidson again.)

A mere six days later, Nov. 25th, Grant launched an assault that broke Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge. Wheeler was immediately recalled with what force he could take away from Longstreet, to help cover the army's retreat. At this time, he only had three brigades, Davidson's (with the 5th), and the two of Kelly's Division. Longstreet was ordered to send his cavalry back to Wheeler, but this did not happen, and the reasons are too complicated for our purpose. Suffice it to say that by Dec. 31st, the official roll stated that Armstrong's, Martin's, and half of Wharton's Division (the other half being Davidson's Brigade with Wheeler) were still with Longstreet.

Thus with Grant threatening to drive like a knife through the heart of the Confederacy, through the heart of a demoralized army, Wheeler's three brigades were pressed into unrelenting service. The terrain from Chattanooga to the Oostanaula River, roughly 35 miles in a straight line, is a series of ridges, thickly forested, that run diagonally from northeast to southwest. These ridges are significant enough to make all the road passes important to both sides, and easily defended. If ever an army needed such a gift of nature, it was the Army of Tennessee after Missionary Ridge. In different circumstances, had Grant been able to move quickly and strike again, fresh from the rout at Missionary Ridge, he could have surely destroyed Bragg's army. As it was, the terrain allowed Bragg's rearguard units to fight effective delaying actions until the Confederates were in the clear and reuniting near Ringgold.

After their return from Longstreet, Wheeler stationed the small force he had on Bragg's right, near Tunnel Hill, guarding the passes, and sending Bragg information about Union movements. Between the cavalry, the units not bloodied at Missionary Ridge, the terrain, and the fact that it was fully winter now, the Union army was effectively stopped not far from Chattanooga. This was fortunate for Wheeler, for by January of 1864 Longstreet still had not returned the balance of his troopers. These men were badly needed by Wheeler and the Army of Tennessee, but instead they were languishing in East Tennessee under Longstreet's misguided notion that he was actually helping Bragg.

During this time, the 5th lived every day on “clay peas, rice crackers, and a small piece of beef broiled in an old iron camp kettle. The beef was so poor a kettle full of it would not make a bird's eye of grease.” (Allen) Funny how times change; today, that lean beef would be considered good for us. They had no tents, or proper clothing, and it snowed heavily that winter.

Whatever Longstreet thought he could accomplish, it certainly wasn't going to save Bragg's job, for even his most ardent supporter President Davis had finally come to grips with reality, and replaced Bragg with Joe E. Johnston. After the debacle at Missionary Ridge was the first time the army began to experience desertion on a significant scale. Even the lowest private could see that their sacrifice, which had won several tactical victories, was wasted under Bragg. Then after Bragg had two men court-martialed and hung in front of Wheeler's cavalry, the men came close to mutiny. The only thing that stopped them was their devotion to Wheeler. (Allen)

The two armies now spent the balance of winter skirmishing, sparring, dueling, and generally testing each other, though with no serious purpose in mind. The men would cut down trees and make log bonfires to stay warm. The fires would melt enough snow so they could lie on the ground. They ate with 6 or 7 men out of the same pot, using wooden spoons. The men were numbered 1 through 7, and starting with number 1 they would pass the pot around, each man taking a spoonful until it was gone.

At one point in February of '64, Mr. Allen, Adjutant of the 5th, was asked to penetrate the Union lines and bring back information. As he approached the Federal pickets, he tied up his horse, and continued on foot, weaving his way between the guards. Allen head for the home of a Mr. Julians, who had a daughter married to Sam Wilson of Co. A, 5th TN. He convinced the old man's other daughter, Miss Julia, to put on the worst clothes she could find, and go into the Union Corps headquarters begging as a pauper. While there she was to discover the names of the units, and generals, and what their plans were. This she did, and very well. The next day she returned and reported all she knew.

Armed with this information, Allen headed back for his own lines. During the night he was discovered and captured. The sentinel took Allen to his commander. Allen freely told the man who he was and where he was going. The Union commander asked him if he was married, and to who. When Allen replied that he was married to Mary E. Thomison, the commander shook his hand, saying he was Wash Lewis, her cousin. After this friendly exchange, the Yankees escorted Allen back to his lines. Again, times have really changed.

For the most part that winter, the two armies reorganized, and stockpiled commissary stores for the spring campaign. Grant was promoted and sent east to break the stalemate in Virginia. In his place he left William T. Sherman, who would have not one army, but three armies totaling about 100,000 men. This actually wasn't any different than the grand divisions, or corps of the Army of the Potomac in terms of size, but in their functionality and with the men commanding them they proved to be more flexible. Eventually, this elasticity, this flexibility, proved to be too much even for Johnston.

On January 2nd, 1864, Johnston wrote to President Davis the findings of his initial inspection: He had about 36,000-40,000 effectives. Wheeler only had 1,600 men screening the army on the front right, and about 850 men under Wharton at Rome, Ga., on the far left flank (I believe this to be Davidson's Brigade, with the 5th attached). Johnston termed the cavalry as “not very efficient: that want of harmony among the superior officers causes its discipline to be imperfect.” That observation was not the worst of it. For much of the winter, many of Wheeler's men would be absent from the front lines, endeavoring to find new mounts to replace their broken down nags. The 5th went to Cave Springs, Georgia while their horses recuperated. These poor horses were surely once proud steeds, sweeping all Union cavalry before them, but now were simply wore out from overuse-a consequence of always being outnumbered, and the Confederacy's reliance on men supplying their own mounts.

Johnston also found a set of officers who had become accustomed to jealous in-fighting, constant accusation and self-defense, and appealing to superior authorities, directly over the head of their commander. For the most part, they had little respect for, and had lost all confidence in Bragg. As a consequence Bragg felt the same about them. This bickering among the army's hierarchy was a spreading cancer for the whole body, and could be felt right down to the lowest private. (Exactly who is at fault for this is like the “chicken or the egg?” question, and out of the realm of the subject for this article, but suffice it to say the situation became a matter of self fulfilling prophecy.)

Late in February Sherman sent his left wing forward in what was a glorified “reconnaissance in force,” with a goal of exposing the Confederate defenses as far as Dalton if possible. Union cavalry hit a Confederate regiment in their winter quarters near Varnell's Station, catching these men completely by surprise. Followed up by infantry, this attack pushed the Confederates back to a place called Buzzard's Roost Gap, just a few miles from Johnston's headquarters at Dalton. The next day, Feb. 25th, another attack was made and met with more determined resistance by the Rebels, before being called off. The Union units involved were ordered back, because Sherman never meant to bring on a real fight. In their retreat to Ringgold, Wheeler assumed the offensive and attacked them like a dog snapping at their heels.

That Union cavalry could ever surprise Confederate infantry speaks loudly about how thinly Wheeler's command was stretched. Sherman's reinforced reconnaissance actually caught Johnston at a bad time, and a real effort might have swept him from the field. As it was, they were let off the hook, and Rebel cavalry even turned the tables somewhat.

As it usually is in war, time helps the defender out of proportion to the attacker-the roles the two sides had now fallen into since Missionary Ridge. Bragg's dismissal pleased his subordinates. Johnston's assignment pleased the rank and file. Thus, over the winter, morale and men both returned to the ranks. Their defensive position was strengthened with breastworks, and redoubts.

The Confederates quick revitalization under Johnston was partially responsible for causing Sherman to pause longer while he tried to gather intelligence, find a weak spot, and examine the terrain. (In fairness, I should also note that Sherman was forced to wait on Grant to prepare his offensive in Virginia, as they had planned over the winter to coordinate in order to keep the Confederates from sending reinforcements from one sector to another.) During this time, Wheeler's cavalry was constantly on the move trying to deny Sherman information.

In this country, Wheeler's men could take full advantage of the limited view, and their own knowledge of the terrain-one brigade being Georgia regiments. Utilizing the thick cover and mountain passes, they could quickly raid Union outpost or depot guards and disappear behind the ridges before retaliation. Ambushing of Union cavalry was not uncommon. In this way the cavalry had an uncanny knack for perpetuating the idea in the minds of the Union soldier that they were always on the defensive rather than the offensive. Simply put, Wheeler always tried to hide his small numbers, his weakness, through bold raiding, and quickness of movement.

A small but often repeated incident is illustrative of the Confederate's audacity. As noted before, in early January Wharton's Division, with only one brigade, 850 men-Davidson's-was stationed on the army's far left flank. This was a pitifully meager force compared to what would normally be required, and given what the Federals could field. Undaunted, Wharton led his men on a raid behind Sherman's army, crossing the Tennessee River, and attacking the rail line several miles north of Chattanooga. (About the same time as this raid, Capt. A. L. Mims is temporarily in command of the 5th, though for what reason I don't know.)

The Union cavalry began to realize, however, that what was good for Wheeler was good for them also; the same terrain that hid Wheeler's raids could be used to make their own raids against the Confederates. This was but a small indication of a bigger irony: the terrain that lent itself so well to the defensive, could also provide protection for offensive forces as they moved down through its many valleys. The obvious strength of these ridges forced Sherman to move continually down the valleys to the south, by his right flank. This was not what Johnston wanted him to do, nor the direction he wanted Sherman to take. More importantly, as long as Johnston remained in a defensive mode, Sherman had the luxury of moving his armies and corps by several different and widely separated roads, forcing Johnston to continually stretch his army to cover all the possibilities. Johnston surely missed an opportunity here. Had he not been so concerned about protecting territory, he could have concentrated his army against one of Sherman's separated columns. (He would make this move at Bentonville, NC, in '65, when it didn't matter anymore.)

Johnston did the best he could, often moving his army just in time to head off Sherman, and frustrating him into making ill advised attacks. Yet, whenever Johnston bloodied his nose, Sherman simply held him in place, while shifting his superior numbers to the right, and always nearer to Atlanta. The fact is that Johnston flat did not have enough troops to avoid being perpetually turned out of position, and in that terrain, and virtually devoid of a good transportation system, he could not move fast enough to make up for this lack of men the way Wheeler could. With three armies that could come at him from different directions, Johnston had to rely on his cavalry to give him the intelligence necessary to make the proper moves; which unfortunately for the Confederates was usually to fall back to avoid being cut off from Atlanta.

As stated, the 5th was near Rome, Ga., under Davidson in January and February. There are some indications that they may have made some forays into Alabama where Union forces were making raids. In early February Davidson's division commander General John A. Wharton was transferred, leaving the brigade without a division commander. By the time of the Dalton fight previously described, Davidson had moved from the army's left to the right. This was in late February 1864. For some reason, Confederate records of this affair are scarce, but Union reports state that they fought against Wheeler, Kelly, and Davidson.

Johnston's concern over the weakness of his cavalry is very evident from his dispatches, to the point that in March nearly all the cavalry was concentrated near Tunnel Hill as the only way to have sufficient force. This didn't stop Wheeler. On March 5th Humes and Davidson surprised the Federals at Leet's Tanyard driving them back to Lee and Gordon's Mill before disappearing beyond Rocky Face Ridge again. This was a small affair, but the Federals were evidently frustrated by the Rebels' continual ability to mount such offensive operations in spite of their deplorable condition-which was well known to all.

With the coming of Spring, Johnston's army began to grow again, and Longstreet finally sent Martin's cavalry division back to Wheeler. However, the horses in this unit were so deficient that Wheeler told Johnston his cavalry could not be ready to campaign again before May. In that time Davidson was transferred to Virginia, and General W. Y. C. Humes was given command of the division that was Wharton's, and Colonel James T. Wheeler assumed command of the brigade consisting of the 1st(6th) TN, 2nd TN, 4th TN (Anderson's), 5th TN, and the 9th TN Battalion. The 5th numbered 601 men. (Allen)

In April, General Patrick Cleburn was on Rocky Face Ridge and requested a small cavalry detail to chase off some Union cavalry that was camped to close for his liking. The 5th was posted at Tunnell Hill, Georgia. Wheeler ordered William Allen to take Lt. Sam Wilson and 100 men, and report to Cleburn. Cleburn explained the mission and the men were off. They hit the camp before dawn, while the Federals were having their breakfast. The raid would have been a complete success if it weren't for the Confederates empty bellies. Seeing the breakfast of ham and coffee laid out before them, the men stopped to gorge. They were unmanageable after that. The Yankees soon realized Allen's detail was smaller than their own numbers, and returned with a charge into their own camp. They chased the Rebels back up Rocky Face Ridge until Cleburn's infantry had to open fire on them. (Allen)

On April 29th, the Federals made another strong reconnaissance against the position held by Humes at Tunnel Hill. Humes reported 20 killed, wounded, or missing. This was probably a precursor to Sherman's spring push, which began in earnest a few days later when he finally moved Johnston out of his position before Dalton. All the winter skirmishing had given Sherman the information he needed for this offensive. With the flexibility of numbers, and the three-army system, Sherman sent Thomas' Army of the Cumberland against Johnston's main line on Rocky Face Ridge. This was to fix Johnston to the front, while Schofield's Army of Ohio attacked Wheeler's position from Varnell's Station, threatening the right flank.

Wheeler's cavalry were attacked for a week, being slowly forced to give ground. A large number of artillery opened up from their new position at Tunnell Hill, and some of the 5th were wounded in this barrage. They fought as both cavalry against cavalry, and infantry against infantry, depending on the circumstances. On May 5th, Humes' Division was stationed near Tyner's Station when it was discovered that the wagon train for Schofield's Corps was moving from Cleveland, Tn., toward Catoosa Springs. The 5th was sent on a raid to intercept this train, but on the 6th they ran into part of Union General McCook's Cavalry division. Forming across the road to Catoosa Springs, they drove the Federal cavalry into some woods where they made a stand, firing from behind trees and fallen logs. During this fire-fight, General Humes and staff rode up to investigate. Now Humes was a fancy dresser, with black hat adorned by a large black plume fastened to the hat with a silver buckle. No doubt he stood out among the shabbily clad Rebels. While observing the action, a Minnie ball slashed across the breast of his coat, convincing the general that his position was too hot for such a beacon! (Allen) (In spite of this anecdote, Humes was a very brave and capable officer.)

Colonel McKenzie had had enough of exchanging lead. Shortly after Humes departed McKenzie rode up and ordered the 5th to charge. The men rose from their cover, and gallantly ran across an open field. The charge was so swift, the Yankees let loose only one volley before fleeing capture. As it was, 70 prisoners were taken, along with 170 wagons.

The next day, May 7th, Wheeler discovered George Stoneman's cavalry division was moving in the direction of Spring Place. Spring Place was about 5 miles due east of Dalton, and therefore on the right rear flank of Johnston's army-which was trying to cover the northeast, north, northwest, and western approaches to Dalton. Wheeler grabbed Humes Division and headed to intercept Stoneman. Arriving that night ahead of Stoneman, he formed Humes' men across the road from Varnell's Station to Spring Place. When Stoneman's cavalry drove in Humes' advance pickets, Wheeler ordered the division to fall back slowly. At the same time, he ordered McKenzie to take the 5th and Colonel Rosser's 11th Texas, and follow a guide who took them far to Stoneman's right flank. As Stoneman advanced, this put McKenzie in his rear, hidden by a small growth of woods. However, by the time they formed for a charge, Stoneman's rear units had advanced farther than McKenzie thought. The order to charge was given. The command galloped forward, rushing between trees, over bushes and logs, like deer bounding through the forest. For half a mile they fired their pistols, gave the Rebel yell, and made such a general ruckus coming through the woods, that some Yankees in the rear surrendered without a fight. Evidently, the Confederates (more like their horses) were too blown to follow up. (Allen's account claims that General Granger and his whole brigade was captured, stating that Granger was surprised to find out the Rebel force was so small, and he being answered with some Texan wit. However, all evidence in the OR indicates no more than a company was captured, and that Granger was actively in the field only days after the incident.)

The whole time this was occupying Johnston's attention, McPherson's Army of Tennessee was moving south behind the frontlines, and far to Sherman's right. McPherson was supposed to pass through Snake Creek Gap, and strike the railroad at Resaca, placing himself in Johnston's rear, and line of retreat. Though McPherson failed to complete his mission on May 9th, it was obvious to Johnston that he could not maintain his Dalton lines.

Johnston's army reacted in time to avoid disaster, and re-establish another position near Resaca in roughly the same configuration as before: running north to south, facing west, with Wheeler's main force forming the end of a slight hook on the right flank, facing north. Sherman's determination to avoid a head on fight by sliding to his right was suspected beforehand by Johnston, and rear units had already been fortifying the hills around Resaca. While Johnston's army was repositioning itself, Wheeler's cavalry fought such a determined delaying action against Schofield as he tried to follow, that Sherman decided to shift the bulk of his force to the Snake Creek sector. This had bought the time Johnston needed to complete the defensive works already begun.

As the Rebel infantry was moving south, Wheeler's cavalry was left alone to cover the northern sector. Despite this tenuous situation, the cavalry was most active. On the 12th, the 5th participated in another raid on a wagon train. This time the Federals burned some themselves to keep them from being captured. Supposedly, the Confederates finished what the Yankees didn't. (Both Allen and Wheeler note this event, though giving wildly different figures for the number of wagons destroyed (250 and 400). Union reports are conspicuously silent about losing any wagons. I suspect there is a gross exaggeration from both sides. I also suspected that this event, and the event of the 7th, may actually be the same event. Though I conclude that they are indeed two distinct events, the Union reports that could have made my decision much easier were of no help.)

On May 13th, McPherson again moved forward, and with the rest of the Union armies as support, the Confederates were unable to stop him. However, by this time, as the Union forces filed out from Snake Creek Gap they found Johnston well prepared and waiting. Near the town of Tilton, Wheeler was attacked vigorously by Schofield, with Stoneman and McCook's cavalry divisions. Wheeler's corps dismounted and fought on foot, falling back line by line, until he finally held a line on the east bank of the Connesauga River.

On May 14th Sherman shifted his attack back to the northern sector held by Scholfield's Army of Ohio. Wheeler had moved forward to see what strength the Federals still had left on his front, and ran into Schofield's advancing troops. He was forced to retreat before this mass of infantry, but in this movement he did discover that the Union line had indeed shifted farther to the left until the Confederate right now overlapped theirs. As a result, the Union attack hit the Confederate line at a point where Hardee's Corps on the left, and Hood's Corps on the right, met and formed an angle near Camp Creek. (Nearer to the middle, rather than the end of Hood's line.) What followed was nothing short of a slaughter, as the Confederates mowed down waves of men in blue.

During the attack at Camp Creek, Wheeler's cavalry sat in their saddles underneath a ridge where General Stevenson's artillery was blasting away at the opposing Union batteries over their heads. Every so often a Union shell would fall short, or explode prematurely, and kill or maim men and horses of the cavalry. Evidently, this greatly rattled their nerves, and eventually one captain of the 5th couldn't stand anymore. Pulling his company out of line, they marched back to the regimental hospital camp. Upon discovering this, Colonel McKenzie had the man arrested.

Encouraged by Wheeler's information and the severe beating he gave the Federals at Camp Creek, Johnston now turned into the counter-puncher he was known to be. He ordered Hood to swing his portion of the “L” shaped line like a door against the Union left flank. This was the reverse of what Sherman had been trying to do to him; intending to cut Sherman off from his line of communications back to Chattanooga. Conversely, discourage by his earlier attack, Sherman decided to refocus on McPherson's front near Resaca, and ordered him to attack Polk's Corps holding the Confederate's far left (southern end). The two opposite attacks were launched almost simultaneously, and both met with some success, yet falling short of their goal. However, McPherson's gains were the more harmful, as Union artillery was now in deadly range of the bridge over the Oostanaula River.

About this same time, a rumor reached Wheeler that Federal cavalry had broke through to the army hospital in Resaca. William Allen of the 5th was ordered to take a squad and go find out what was happening. Arriving at the hospital he found that the Union batteries were trying to shell the railroad bridge and pontoon bridges over the Oostanaula River, and that citizens of the town were taking shelter near the hospital. Shells were bursting and splinters flying through the air when some of the women clamored for Allen to give them some guidance. Allen told them to lie down, which they did, most burying their faces from the terror. One woman was too curious, and lifted her head to look about when she noticed Allen was still mounted on his horse. Among the din and the roar, she proceeded to give him a tongue lashing. (Allen)

On May 15th the two commanders nearly repeated the same performance as the day before. Both attacked each other in turn on the northern end on the line, and again there was nothing to show for it except a lot of casualties. In the mean time, though McPherson had failed to take Resaca the day before, a Union division had managed to cross the Oostenaula farther south at Lay's Ferry. Johnston was most anxious about his left rear, and ordered Wheeler to the threatened area. This proved to be fortunate, as Union General Stoneman gained the rear of Hardee's Corps and led a cavalry attack against his hospital post-for real this time. Wheeler counter-attacked Stoneman with Humes' Division and Allen's Brigade, and re-established security in Hardee's rear. He captured 40 prisoners and two stands of colors, showing that though very outnumbered and weak in resources, the Rebel cavalry was still effective when it met the enemy. However, in spite of Wheeler's dry report on this affair, it had to be disconcerting that he was no longer able to prevent such an insult in the first place. (There are hints in the OR that Wheeler's men were forced at times to man the lines as infantry, thereby preventing them from keeping up with movements of the Union cavalry.)

The Union crossing at Lay's Ferry was confirmed, and spelled the end for Johnston at Resaca. Another retreat was ordered. The 5th was left as part of the rear guard. They helped pull some of the artillery over the pontoon bridge by hand. Around midnight they were told to cross over themselves, and cut the pontoon loose. Exhausted, some of the men fell asleep by the road, near the bank of the river. Here occurred one of those unnecessarily tragic events. One of the sleeping men rolled over and discharged his rifle, killing one of his compatriots. (Allen)

Many accounts of Resaca state that it was an inconclusive battle. While the casualties were virtually even at about 2,700-2,800 each side, this number was less in proportion to the forces available for Sherman than it was for Johnston. The South could not afford to trade casualties. Besides, Johnston was forced to abandon what was a strong position. Under the circumstances, the Confederates performed at least as well if not better in the 3-day period, but in terms of results, the Federals were the ones who made progress toward their goal.

If the retreat from Chattanooga had been demoralizing, this one was perhaps even more disheartening. The Confederates had now been forced from three strong positions; each one on high ground reinforced with breastworks. At Chattanooga, the army had lost faith in their commander (deserved or undeserved), and did not perform up to a level worthy of its defensive strength. But Joe Johnston was loved by the rank and file, and supposedly had reinvigorated their zeal and morale. Add to this the fact that the terrain of Northern Georgia suited his style of fighting perfectly, and yet here they were, beaten again.

Or, were they beaten? That question is what frustrated the Army of Tennessee more than anything; they were not beaten, but retreat-especially continuous retreat-has always been perceived as the universal sign of defeat. No matter what the benefits may be in the long run, the rank and file soldier cared nothing for strategy. Instead, he could only see that his family and farm was being left far behind enemy lines, and for this he worried-with good reason.

The Battle of Resaca also made a deep impression on Sherman. Despite his superiority of numbers, the casualties there were frightening. He had avoided a full-fledged attack on Dalton for the very reason that Johnston was so well entrenched there, but gave in to impatience at Resaca. He determined to refrain from such brute tactics as much as possible, and over the next month repeatedly moved around Johnston's left flank.

A more apt description of Sherman's movement may be that he “slid” perpetually to his right. After Resaca, that was from northeast to southwest, the line of the Oostanaula, which ran from Resaca to Rome. Sherman's men on the one side moving as stated, and Johnston on the other trying to prevent Sherman from crossing ahead of him. Though Sherman wanted to avoid head on battle, and Johnston continually tried to keep natural barriers such as the river between them, they were never really out of contact. There was fighting every day, especially for the cavalry of both sides.

For the immediate two days following Resaca, Wheeler's men forced the Federals to advance in line of battle which gave Johnston time to get away unscathed. But the affect of this constant day and night contact with the enemy was beginning to take a psychological toll on the cavalry. Near Calhoun, Georgia, having been 30 hours without food for man or horse, the 5th was finally to be relieved by General John S. Williams' Brigade. To McKenzie's extreme consternation, when Williams showed up he immediately announced that his men would eat before they took their place on the line. The two men engaged in a heated argument.

While this was going on, the Yankees came in sight-though unnoticed by the antagonists-and deployed for battle, unlimbering two cannon. The Yankees probably couldn't believe their good fortune, to have two high-ranking officers in their sight, and let go the first salvo. The screaming shells didn't interrupt their debate. Instead, each took the opportunity to praise the Yankees for what they hoped their guns would do to the other! Curses flew. Another round was fired, but still off the mark. Before the artillerist could adjust their aim, McKenzie rode to the regiment and pulled them back out of harm's way.

Arguments aside, Williams did finally relieve McKenzie's men. Not long after however, Howard's Corps drove in against Williams. Humes brought his division up. Williams' and Ashby's brigades were pushed back through the town of Calhoun until they found safety in the infantry. Piling railroad ties for protection, they made a stand. It was soon discovered that the ties were more dangerous when cannon balls struck, scattered, and splintered them.

Union forces did manage to cross the river farther south, and threaten Johnston's rear at Adairsville. The army fell back again south of that town. Humes Division fought through the night while the army fell back even farther to a line from Cassville to Kingston, Georgia. Johnston surely knew the affect constant retreating had on morale, and on the 19th he decided it was enough. Hood, whose corps was on the right, was ordered to attack Schofield's Army of Ohio as it moved down from Adairsville. Under the erroneous impression that he was the one being threatened on his flank, he called off the attack. By the time the mistake was discovered other Union forces were threatening the opposite end of Johnston's line.

The Etowah River was at his back, and on the 20th Johnston put it between him and Sherman. Wheeler crossed his cavalry corps behind the infantry, and burned the bridges. Only now did the cavalry get a few days of much needed rest. From the attack on Dalton until Sherman crossed the Etowah, Wheeler's command suffered 548 casualties (not including Jackson, who was operating on the army's left under Johnston's supervision), 117 of which were from Humes' Division, about 10% of his force-twice that of the infantry (opposite of the usual). This is a testament to the unceasing violence these men endured for so long a period, and it was not going to get any better.

On May 24th (or 25th) Wheeler re-crossed the Etowah and raided the Union rear at Cassville Station. There he found a large supply train, and after destroying what he couldn't take away, he returned to the Etowah with 70 wagons, 182 prisoners, and 300 horses and mules. In the not so distant past, romps such as this would have been praised and glorified by the masses, its leader adorned with heroes wreathes, the subject of bards songs and poems, but now it was merely another in a long string of meaningless victories; meaningless, because they had no impact on the campaign. Their only value lay in the much-needed supplies the cavalry would bring back to a supply-starved army, and there was merit in that. But Sherman wasn't looking back with any trepidation anymore. He was focused on Atlanta, and nothing else would distract him.

With a large river between the opposing forces, Sherman was forced to move by his right flank and cross the river farther west. Johnston had to fall back again from the Etowah to protect his line back to Atlanta-which was getting closer. When he did, the Yankees poured over the river, and near Altoona they came on so fast they came within sight of the Confederate wagon train. The 5th was the army's rearguard. Colonel McKenzie urged the train to move faster so he could deploy the regiment across the Altoona to Ackworth road, but it was too late. They had to fight in a somewhat disorganized state.

Night of the 26th brought a storm of evil proportions, courtesy of Mother Nature. In spite of this, man's own thunder never ceased as the 5th could hear between the cracks of lightening Kelly's Division fighting against Stoneman. Except for the storm, all was quiet on Humes' front. Colonel McKenzie took sick during the bad weather, and had to turn over command of the 5th to Lt. Col. Montgomery.

Two Union infantry corps, with two divisions of cavalry had crossed the Etowah farther west and was heading south for Dallas, Georgia. Sherman's other corps facing Johnston's main line now moved to their right to link up at Dallas. Dallas was on Johnston's far left flank, and Johnston shifted his corps to meet this new threat. Wheeler also moved his tired and wet troopers toward Dallas. Taking Kelly's Division, Martin's Division, and Ashby's Brigade (from Humes) with himself, he left Humes with the remainder to cover their move and catch up later.

Short of Dallas, they had stopped to eat and rest, when after half an hour shots were heard near the advanced brigade of Allen, who was posted on the right of Patrick Cleburn's Division. Immediately the bugles sounded, and Wheeler leapt to his saddle shouting orders to Colonel James T. Wheeler who was commanding Ashby's Brigade. General Wheeler galloped on ahead while Colonel Wheeler formed his brigade with the 5th in front. As they rode, cannon could be heard to the west of them.

The sound they heard was the attack of O. O. Howard's Corps. Two days before (the 25th), Joe Hooker's advance ran into Hood's Corps at New Hope Church (just west of Pickett's Mill) spawning an unexpectedly bloody fight. The Confederate strength at New Hope Church convinced Sherman that he had been foiled in trying to turn Johnston's left flank. Sherman now decided to send Howard's Corps against what he thought would be Johnston's right flank, where the cavalry had just arrived.

Colonel Wheeler found General Wheeler at a road crossing of the Pickets Mill and Powder Springs Road, and the Dallas to Ackworth Road. Allen's Brigade of Kelly's Division was already deeply engaged with flank elements of General Hazen's Brigade (Wood's Division) of Howard's Corps. In the wooded terrain part of Hazen's men strayed to far to the left and found themselves in a ravine formed by Little Pumpkin Vine Creek. Wheeler's advance pickets began an enfilade fire on them from the ridge across the creek. The Federals were not expecting to find cavalry on their flank, and determined to clear the ridge of this menace before they could assault the Confederate's main line.

Seeing that the Federal line was gaining the ridge above them, General Wheeler ordered Colonel Wheeler to charge the brigade, and retake the ridge. The charge was made. The Yankees poured lead down on them. Colonel Wheeler had his horse shot out from under him. Borrowing another, it was also shot a short time later. Lt. Col. Montgomery was also wounded. The attack stopped on the crest, where some old fashioned toe-to-toe fighting stabilized the front.

This is one of those points in a battle when officers are all important, but the brigade and the 5th's officer corps was already depleted. McKenzie was sick from before the battle, and Montgomery was wounded. Captain Mims was next senior, but was trying to get his wounded back down the slope. Adjutant Allen found Captain Blythe of Co. B, and informed him that he should take charge of the regiment, but Blythe replied that he was going to take care of his own company first. The Union infantry attacked again. Under these circumstances the Rebel line disintegrated, and fell back down the hill.

General Wheeler met them at the bottom, and hotly insisted that they go back and hold the crest this time. The second charge regained the top again, but the men were blown from the two uphill runs. Union artillery now threw its weight against the crest. The tops of trees and branches rained down on the attackers-turned-defenders. After about a half hour of this tumult, the Yankees made another charge, driving the Rebels off the hill for a second time.

The same scene met them on their return. General Wheeler was relentless in his demand that the hill not only be taken, but held. Colonel Wheeler, standing well over 6 feet tall, now moved along the line exhorting his men. Reinvigorated, the brigade's third charge was spirited and took the Federals somewhat by surprise, perhaps not believing the Rebels had anything left. This time they didn't stop at the crest, but continued down the other side, running over the intermingled dead and wounded, blue and gray clad soldier alike, lying in the dense woods, and forced the Federals over Pumpkin Vine Creek, which ran through the shallow below. On the hill opposite the creek, the Federals stopped within the safety of their artillery.

The Rebel line was now in danger of losing their hard-fought ground due to lack of ammunition. Just in time, elements of Cleburn's infantry division arrived to take their place. Colonel Wheeler ordered his cavalry to fall back to their horses. While doing so, a captain from General Humes' staff, unaware of the situation, rode up to Adjutant Allen, demanded to know why they were retreating, and intimated that they were behaving cowardly. The captain called for Colonel Wheeler, thinking he was going to report their cowardice. When Col. Wheeler arrived and inquired as to the problem. Allen explained that they had been accused of cowardice, and that if he had had any ammunition left, he'd have shot the man. Wheeler unceremoniously took the captain by the throat, shook him, and sent him away-no doubt with proverbial tail between his legs! (Allen)

That night, Captain Jack Reagan of Co. A, Captain John Blythe of Co. B, and Adjutant William Allen walked through the woods together looking for their wounded. The plethora of voices, mingling as one in their agony, made it difficult to discern individuals in the darkness. Sometimes the soldier they found was Union, sometimes Confederate. Near morning Reagan found his brother, silent and lifeless.

There was no time to dwell on their fallen comrades. Sherman had left his lifeline, the railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta, in his attempt to turn Johnston's left. Having failed, he was now in dire need to re-supply his army, and headed back for the Railroad near Altoona. The cavalry tried to get between Sherman and the railroad at Altoona. Colonel Wheeler was ordered back to Humes on May 28th. Kelly had already been ordered to Altoona. Humes ordered Wheeler to move Ashby's brigade north, and line up next to Kelly, guarding Ackworth. These dispositions were to protect Hood's troops while they were moving back to the right.

Ashby's brigade fought McCook's Division until morning of the 29th . Stoneman supported by infantry managed to force Kelly back. This left Humes' right uncovered, so he fell back also. General Wheeler sent Humes an order not to give anymore ground; to keep the Ackworth road clear. That night there was an artillery duel that lit up the night air like a Fourth of July display. (Allen)

On the 30th Hood moved to the right, and Humes moved to the right of him, blocking the Ackworth road to Marietta. The division stood dismounted in some woods, watching the sparks fly from another night fight. Tired as they were, the sight was exhilarating to the men. Around midnight things quieted down, but sporadic fire continued. Presumably, they were able to get some sleep during the early morning lull.

The 31st saw the same further movement by both armies: Sherman to his left; Johnston to his right. When McCook's cavalry began shifting to their left, Union infantry moved up to take their place on the line. As this maneuver was taking place, Humes' Division attacked, evidently under the assumption he was attacking McCook. There was surprise on both sides, and both sides kept prisoners as they disengaged.

June found Johnston's army in an arc from the left around Lost Mountain, Pine Mountain, and the right crossing the Ackworth to Big Shanty road. But he was being stretched too thin, and Sherman knew it. That was his game; either move completely around Johnston's flank, or force him to stretch so thin to extend his flanks that he can be broken in the middle. Better yet, do this in the hope that Johnston realizes the danger himself and retreats voluntarily. Thus Sherman gains ground, and saves lives.

The month of June brought rain, incessant rain. The red Georgia clay became very slippery, causing great havoc for artillery and horses in the uneven terrain. Eventually the persistent downpour turned the clay into mud that would grab and hold anything that venture in. Cannons sunk to their axles, horses to their bellies, and many a man lost his shoes (those lucky enough to have them) in the muck.

Union cavalry had gotten beyond Wheeler's right. Ashby's brigade was sent to intercept it. The ensuing battle was light on casualties, but it was discovered that Schofield's Army of Ohio was even farther to the right than this cavalry. Their rear was threatened. This must have been disheartening; there simply weren't enough men to cover everything Sherman had to throw at them. On June 4th Johnston withdrew and contracted his lines along Lost Mountain to Brush Mountain; Pine Mountain was in the center.

Humes was stationed across the Canton to Marietta road (east of the Ackworth to Marietta road). Sherman's troops bore down on all fronts, not with large-scale attacks, but by constant, continuous pressure. On the 11th Humes was brought to battle at Hardshell Church on the Canton Road. Again on the 13th, Stoneman's and Garrard's cavalry were threatening to out flank Kelly's division on the extreme right. Kelly was now trying to protect Marietta from the east. Humes moved to his right to assist Kelly. Together, the two fought off the Union troopers near Mt. Olivett Church.

Colonel McKenzie recovered his health and returned to duty on June 14th. He came back with an order from General Wheeler promoting Adjutant William Allen to Major for his bravery at Pickett's Mill. Allen declined the new position, preferring his role as adjutant. That same day General Leonidas Polk was killed on Pine Mountain by a well aimed artillery round, while observing Sherman's movements. General Loring took over his corps.

This narrative has been necessarily focused on the army's right, that being where Wheeler commanded, consequently where my Kincaid ancestors fought, but there was more cavalry on the left. Jackson's Division-not under Wheeler's command-maintained it's place on the army's far left for some time. Now and then, as the situation required, Wheeler would have to send a brigade from his right to Jackson. When an Alabama regiment found itself out of position, surrounded, and had to surrender, Ashby's brigade was transfer to the left. Having only just arrived, the brigade was immediately thrust into duty. Union artillery had found a good spot to shell the flank of Hardee's line. Jackson's and Ashby's troopers were ordered to hold the line while Hardee found a new line a few miles back.

The next day was an all day affair, with the cavalry fighting until Union artillery would come up, then falling back to a new line. Sherman had shifted Schofield to the Union right flank, and he was now driving in toward the Sandtown Road, turning Hardee's left. The cavalry rushed back to Hardee's left rear in time to stall Schofield's approach. Johnston's line was now necessarily bent back on the left. Kilpatrick's cavalry moved down the Powder Springs Road to the southwest of Marietta.. McKenzie (temporarily commanding Ashby's brigade) was ordered to hold the ford where the road crossed Noyes Creek. There he met and skirmished with Kilpatrick until Jackson arrived. Kilpatrick continued to feel his way around the Rebel left, and sought to infiltrate the valley formed by Nickajack Creek (Nickajack flows into the Chattahoochee River, far in the rear of Marietta). Another battle here prevented this threat to cut Marietta from the south.

However, this latest series of moves illustrates that though the Rebel cavalry had so far managed to avoid any real disaster, it could not stop the Union cavalry from moving around the perimeter. The Federals could dictate all the moves, and the Rebels necessarily had to respond, dashing from one threatened area to another. The affect on their physical and mental well-being was a slow but steady deterioration of health, spirit, and overall abilities. This affect was not suddenly perceptible, and was hidden in many respects by their incredible dedication to the cause, but one cannot possibly be exposed to battle, deprived of sleep and healthy food for so long a period without some ill affect. The wonder is that they lasted so long.

On June 19th McKenzie was ordered to report back with the brigade to Humes on the right. Union General Garrard's division had also been transfer to the Union left, thus dictating the necessary Confederate response. By noon they were already engaged near the Canton road to Marietta. This was one of the few instances in the Civil War when cavalry fought in the grand Napoleonic style, in open vistas, mounted lines galloping forward, colliding in a great crash of flesh and steel, made more horrible by the weight of the animals themselves.

Charge after charge was wearing on the Confederate line. Wheeler ordered the men to fall back. After the two sides disengaged from each other, Garrard moved around to the Rebel right and rear. Wheeler was informed, ordered an about face, and charged Garrard while he was moving. The attack caught him unaware, and drove the division to flight. The Confederates were chasing him, and taking many prisoners, until they came too close to a line of Union infantry and artillery. The batteries opened up with canister and grapeshot, forcing Wheeler to retire and give up most of the prisoners. The Union infantry moved out to support Garrard, ending the affair. (Allen)

The stretching of his left forced Johnston to pull his right, under Hood, back to Kennesaw Mountain. Wheeler took up a position to the right of General Hood across the valley between Brush Mountain and Kennesaw. General Loring (Polk was killed at Pine Mt on June 14th) was now in the center, and Hardee on the left, terminating on the road from Powder Springs to Dallas, about 3 miles northwest of Powder Springs.

Kennesaw Mountain (including Little Kennesaw) was the key to this position in the eyes of both commanders. The Western and Atlanta Railroad, which fed both armies from opposite directions, came down from the north, turns to the east at the base of Kennesaw, passing across the north face, then turns south through the pass between it and Brush Mountain, and down to the town of Marietta. Johnston's guns on Kennesaw controlled the railroad, and main approach to Marietta. Both armies had to keep at least one end of their line tethered to this artery. But Sherman knew Johnston's vulnerable point was always his left, Johnston's left.

Sherman kept up his pressure on the Confederate left. Federal forces were again threatening to cross Noyes Creek. Johnston decided to employ the same leapfrog move the cavalry had been using, with his infantry. On the 21st he pulled Hood out of line on the right, and marched him to the end of his line on the left. Part of Humes' Division preceded him, but the O.R. isn't clear about which regiments. He planned to use Hood in a surprise attack. The balance of Humes Division and Kelly's Division were dismounted and manned the trenches of Kennesaw until Loring's Corps (ex Polk's) could shift over. This was a very tenuous time for the cavalry, and the army, for they were spread very thin here and had to convince McPherson's men that Hood still occupied the works. Had McPherson ever discovered that only cavalry was manning the lines in front of him, he surely would have drove through to Marietta.

The next day Hood attacked the Union right at Kolb's Farm. The attack was not as strong as Johnston had hoped it would be, and Hood's losses were downright unacceptable. At the same time, he stopped Sherman in his tracks, and bought the army some time. Johnston quickly shifted his lines again so that Loring relieved Wheeler on Kennesaw Mountain, Hardee became the center, and Hood on the left.

The Kolb's Farm attack could have been a master-stroke by Johnston had his losses not been so large (about 1,000). As it was, Sherman was frustrated by Johnston's skillful maneuvering of his outnumbered troops. Over the next few days Sherman's impatience over reaching Marietta grew again until he devised a plan that would repeat the mistake he made at Resaca. The attack at Kolb's Farm had uncovered the truth for Sherman; the Kennesaw Mountain line had to be thin now if Hood was on the left. On the 27th he launched a full-scale attack, the thrust of which was aimed at Kennesaw Mountain, and was mauled to the tune of 3,000 casualties.

There were some positive results from the attack for Sherman. The fierceness of the attack pinned down all Confederate forces, allowing Stoneman's cavalry to finally clear the Rebel left unhindered. Unhindered because Jackson's cavalry, and that portion of Humes' division already mentioned, were busy defending the line against elements of Schofield's Corps. For Johnston's Army of Tennessee, yet another victory meant retreat.

To Sherman's credit, other Union commanders in similar circumstances would have hunkered down, licked their wounds, flood Washington with all kinds of excuses why everything conspired against them, and then spend several weeks if not months preparing to get whipped again. But not Sherman. If Lee and Jackson had a symbiotic relationship, so did Sherman and Grant. These two men knew only one way to go: forward all the time, and whatever the cost. Grant was executing the same strategy in Virginia, and with the same results-though at a much higher cost.

Sherman may have been frustrated by the result at Kennesaw, but he was not stumped over what to do next. He pulled the same piggy-back maneuver as Johnston did to produce the affair at Kolb's Farm, and ordered McPherson's army to march from his left to the right flank, and cross the Chattahoochee (the last big river before Atlanta) at Turners Ferry. Johnston formed his army in an arc around his retreat bridges over the Chattahoochee. Both wings were touching the river.

At this point I should review the cavalry's organization, as it was somewhat confusing during the Kennesaw fight, and gels again in the events afterward. Colonel Henry M. Ashby assumed command of Humes' ex-brigade (ex-Scott, ex-Davidson), was wounded and temporarily commanded by James T. Wheeler, and other subordinates. On June 30th Humes Division contained the brigades of Ashby (1st, 6th, 2nd, 5th TN, 9th TN Btn), Harrison (3rd AR, 65 NC Btn, 4th TN, 8th TX, 11th TX), Williams (1st (3rd) KY, 2nd KY, 9th KY, 2nd KY Btn, Allison's Sqd., Detachment of Hamilton's Btn). Hannon was transferred to Kelly's Division. The rest of Wheeler's Corps consisted of Martin's Division (2 brigades), and Kelly's Division (2-1/2 brigades). Jackson's Division was 3 brigades, but was still answering to Johnston. (Jackson's Cavalry and Polk's old corps were actually designated as part of the old Army of Mississippi, which had combined with the Army of Tennessee under Johnston.)

As stated before, Humes' Division was fragmented during the previous battles. Shortly after Kennesaw, Wheeler and Hood discussed another raid on Sherman's rail line, but Wheeler insisted that he needed Humes' entire division (who was still holding Hood's left) and asked if Jackson and Hood's men could cover that part of the line held by the missing units. Hood replied that he could do so, but only Johnston could authorize moving Humes' units, and only through Jackson. This incident basically confirms that command over the borrowed unit was taken from Wheeler, though he remained its commander on paper. When Wheeler appealed to Johnston, Johnston informed him that McPherson was at that time moving his whole command to the Federal right, and that made the cavalry on his left necessary where it was.

Sherman did not attack Johnston in his bridgehead, but he did want to save the bridges. On July 2nd Humes moved his division east of the railroad, and skirmished with Garrard's cavalry at Soap Creek. That night he moved farther east to the road from Roswell to Atlanta. On the 4th he and Kelly fought off Garrard, who was anxious to save the bridge, while Wheeler crossed the balance of his command over the Chattahoochee. Wheeler's artillery then protected Humes and Kelley while they crossed, and held Garrard at bay until the bridge was fired.

As earlier stated, Sherman had sent Stoneman's cavalry and McPherson's Corps farther south and west to hopefully cross the Chattahoochee unopposed. Johnston was not surprised by this move. Earlier he had the Georgia State Militia posted at various river crossings, and ordered a report as to the condition of these crossings. With this information and the report of McPherson's move-which he had no doubt of its meaning- in hand, he ordered Humes Division to reinforce the state troops.

Stoneman did however manage to force a crossing far to the left of Jackson's cavalry, and was in route to the railroad behind Johnston, south of the Chattahoochee, when on the 6th Humes Division intercepted him at a point where the road from Atlanta forks to Newnan and Sandtown. Humes stopped him, and began driving Stoneman back on Jackson, who was in pursuit from behind. Stoneman sought the shelter of his own artillery on the north side of the Chattahoochee, but not before Jackson took several prisoners.

After Stoneman was dealt with, Humes ordered McKenzie to take Ashby's brigade to the right again, where Kelly was having trouble with Schofield's infantry. Schofield had sent a division over the river, beyond Johnston's right flank. These troops were beginning to entrench on a small ridge between Rottenwood Creek and the Chattahoochee. McKenzie was ordered drive in their pickets and find out what they were about. The 5th pressed forward until discovering their trenches, and decided they were too strong. Sherman had a foothold on the south bank.

Sherman had wanted Marietta badly, and so he now took some time to consolidate his position there and bring up supplies. As he studied his foe across the river, Sherman had to choose between continuing his previous tactics or try something new. The terrain so far had encouraged his army to move by its right flank, but this close to Atlanta that was not a factor, and besides, food supplies on that side of Georgia and in east Alabama had been depleted by both sides. He decided that by shifting to the east he could not only cut Atlanta's rail connection to the eastern coast-a major supply route-but he could also tap into the food sources of eastern Georgia. Thus he planned to have one army hold Johnston in front, while the other two crossed the Chattahoochee on the left-the opposite of what he had been doing.

The move was successful, partly because Johnston wasn't even there anymore. He had blown the bridges on his front and pulled back to the Atlanta defenses. Johnston had his own plan, and was inviting Sherman to cross the Chattahoochee. Seeing that Sherman's new route would also necessitate crossing Peachtree Creek, his plan was to attack while Sherman's forces were divided by the creek.

On the 10th McKenzie crossed Peachtree Creek and found Union forces gathering there. This patrol was the source of some humor in an otherwise humorless situation. While on a patrol, W. C. Godsey had lost a horse in quicksand, and had to procure an unbroken mare. When the 5th began skirmishing with Federal outpost the firing frightened the mare. The wild animal bolted down the road ahead of the others, so that the Yankees thought he was leading a charge, and caused their retreat. Godsey managed to turn the animal back to safety. (Allen)

Sherman's men moved steadily over the river, behind Peachtree Creek, then over the creek, making their way to the northeast of Atlanta. Wheeler's cavalry shadowed them as they moved, now and then striking at Garrard's advance cavalry. By the 14th Garrard had reached the Georgia Railroad, just east of Decatur. Here McKenzie and Kelley fought for two hours before the arrival of Union infantry forced them to fall back behind Peavine Creek, near the terminus of Johnston's line. Here they skirmished for a couple of days while more Union troops crossed Peachtree Creek, and Johnston prepared to attack these unsuspecting soldiers.

The time had come for Johnston to uncork his blow. Unfortunately, on July 17, 1864, he was informed that he had been relieved of command, and John Bell Hood would take his place. Though the Army of Tennessee was initially encouraged when Johnston took over, continual retreat, even when earning tactical successes, had eroded its morale again. Hood and Johnston were as different as night and day, and Hood was chomping at the bit for the army to attack Sherman. Retreating and digging was not his style. This attitude suited President Jefferson Davis, and a Confederate Congress that was getting very nervous considering both of its main armies had its backs against the two cities left that were icons of the South: Richmond and Atlanta. For Davis there was more at stake than just the morale of the armies, but also the morale of the people at home, whose support was now waning in earnest. Davis knew that always being on the defensive was a sure sign of one's weakness, and he wanted someone to show the people back home that the Confederacy was still strong enough to attack. Davis was used to observing up close and personal, the way Union generals in Virginia would take their whipping like a schoolboy from his headmaster-who was smaller than the schoolboy. He could not understand why Johnston (or Bragg for that matter) hadn't treated Sherman the same way. Davis was totally ignorant of the kind of man Sherman was, or the difference between the Union soldiers of the east versus the western soldier. Johnston's style of fighting had irked Davis from early in the war, and the two men never got along because of it. For this reason, he wanted to replace Johnston regardless of what the realities were.

Hood was Davis's obvious choice, given the President's dislike of Johnston's defensive strategy. He had served under Lee in all of his most glorious campaigns, and Davis hoped Hood had learned from this experience through osmosis. One indication of how badly Davis wanted to take the offensive in the west, and just how out of touch with reality he was, is the fact that he made the change of command despite the fact that Lee did not endorse the move. Lee knew Hood was an excellent division commander, and a fearless fighter, but had serious reservations about his ability to lead an army.

According to Allen, when he read the order to the 5th Tennessee, “strong men wept, timid men pulled their old hats and caps over their faces to hide their tears, saying goodby old Joe, goodby, Southern Confederacy.” Nevertheless, the change was made, and Hood wasted no time in displaying his qualities. Within a few days he gave Davis what he wanted, and justified Lee's intuition at the same time.

Johnston's original plan to attack while Sherman's force was split by Peachtree Creek was acceptable to Hood, and he decided to carry it out. But the change of command, the necessity of making his own arrangements, cost the new commander two more days. In that time Wheeler was left trying to slow the infantry advance with his cavalry. The only support behind him was more Georgia State Militia manning the trenches. They didn't want too many Federals to cross or they would be too strong, but that fear would come to fruition.

By the time Hood was ready to attack, three full Union divisions had entrenched on high ground, and more troops were pushing Wheeler far to the east side. As the Union line lengthened, Hood's original point of attack became mute, and there was another delay to shift his own units. Late, and uncoordinated, the attack was nonetheless made fiercely and bravely. The Union line held, and Confederate losses were heavy. Hood now showed his true colors (proving Lee's reservations to be correct). Undaunted by the initial repulse he hurled Cheatham's Corps (his old corps) at the happy Federals again and again. After five hours of utter failure he finally had enough, and slithered back into the Atlanta lines.

Hood wasn't through. He now wanted to leave two of his three corps, under new commanders Cheatham and Stewart to hold the Atlanta entrenchments, while Hardee's corps and Wheeler would swing far to the southeast. Turning north, Hardee would hit McPherson on his left flank. Wheeler would then dash for Decatur in McPherson's rear, and recapture the town. Hopefully this would open up the rail line again.

Wheeler's part of the plan went well enough, actually capturing some prisoners, artillery, camp equipment, and McPherson's hospital. He was forced to return when informed that Hardee's attack had gone awry. Part of Cheatham's Corps was supposed to move out and press McPherson lightly to fix his attention forward so Hardee could make his move undiscovered. Unfortunately, McPherson's men either fell back or were driven back before the feint. Hardee turned north a little too soon, so that rather than hit McPherson's left rear, he now ran into an alerted line. Still the attack crumpled the Union left at first, but General Dodge eventually rallied his corps, and formed a solid wall of resistance.

Thinking he would be taking advantage of Hardee's attack, Hood sent Cheatham's men forward in earnest. They found the Union defense in their front unmolested by Hardee's attack, and were severely treated by the Yankees. The attack failed, and Sherman retained control of the eastern rail line, but he lost McPherson, who was killed in Hardee's attack.

Hood's army returned yet again to their trenches missing another 8,000 from their ranks. (Many of these were taken prisoner, unable to make it back.) Hood's attacks provided another way to measure the difference between he and Johnston. Under Hood, the army had suffered more casualties in two days, and gained no geographic advantage, than Johnston had in two and a half months. Within the trenches the army was safe enough, and took a few days to rest-including Wheeler.

Since the railroads play a big part in the battles for Atlanta, and are often used as landmarks, some description is in order here. Also keep in mind that these lines are called by different names, depending on who's map it is, and what section of the line is in question. There is the ability to refer to a line by it's city to city connection, which is far more helpful to the reader than any official names. Nevertheless, here it is anyway for accuracy.

The Atlantic and Western (or Western and Atlantic on some old maps, but I prefer the initials A&W)) comes down from the north into Atlanta, and splits just before the railroad yard. The A&W continues down the western side of the yard, and the eastern leg becomes the Georgia RR. The Georgia RR leaves Atlanta to the east, while the A&W leaves to the southwest. Just south of the railroad yard there is a small spur that connects the two lines again and thus forms the base of a triangle around the yard.

What is known as the Battle of Atlanta was over, but not the battles for Atlanta. After the Peachtree Creek battle, these battles that made up the struggle for that city were mostly based on the goal of either cutting or saving the just described railroads. The northen line was gone by virtue of Sherman's approach. The Georgia (eastern) line was now cut off, and the attempt to open it failed. The only lifeline left was the A&W. The two lines that made up the A&W came from near Mobile on the Gulf coast, and Savannah on the Atlantic coast.

Sherman determined to choke Hood out of Atlanta. Having secured the northern and eastern approaches, he began extending his line to the west and south so that his investment was in the basic shape of a semi-circle-his right extending more west than south. Hood's own line naturally had to conform. Union cavalry under Garrard and Stoneman anchored his left, and McCook and Kilpatrick anchored the right.

As hellish as it had been in the east, it had been that quiet in the west, but not for long. Union cavalry was making some alarming movements on both flanks at the same time. Wheeler again divided Humes Division, sending General Harrison with the 8th TX, 11th TX, 1st TN, and the 5th TN to join Jackson on the western flank. The balance of Humes Division remained with Wheeler. On July 27th Wheeler took off after Garrard, whose division was heading toward Covington, southeast of Atlanta. The next day Wheeler overtook the head of his column, stopped him and drove back to the Union lines. At the same time he learned that Stoneman was leading another division south for Andersonville, hoping to free the prisoners in that infamous place. Another large cavalry force of maybe 3,000 men under General McCook had crossed the Chattahoochee at Campbellton in the west, and was headed for the Macon rail line (Macon and Western). Sherman hoped these two wings would unite south of Atlanta.

In the mean time, Sherman made the westward shift previously spoken of. This time he leap-frogged McPherson's Corps, now Howard's, from the left to his right. This abandonment of the lines in front of Wheeler is what allowed him to chase after Garrard-the Georgia Railroad had already been so destroyed, Sherman did not fear it's use. The arrival of masses of Union infantry on the Confederate left forced Jackson's cavalry to remain where it was, and masked McCook's force that crossed the Chattahoochee at Campbellton.

The double, nay triple, cavalry raid from opposite directions was a perfect example of placing your opponent on the “horns of a dilemma.” Sherman knew his cavalry outnumbered Wheeler, and he probably knew Wheeler's men had been fighting along side of the infantry just to deal with his own infantry. There was no way for him to deal with all these threats. At least one of them had to make it to one of the two southern railroads-the Atlantic and West, and Macon and Western-and destroy the track. Atlanta was now being threatened from all sides.

Hood informed Wheeler that Jackson's cavalry was too out of position to stop the raid from Campbellton. Imagine Wheeler's crisis: he had just foiled one raid, only to find out another 2,000 men were heading around him farther south, while 3,000 men were approaching him from the rear. Yet, this is where Confederate cavalry, and its commander was at its best, riding free and hard, un-tethered by the needs of the army.

I warn that the following string of events will bounce back and forth between the eastern and western scene's, and could produce much confusion of the mind, and perhaps some dizziness. However, this is as it happened, and time-wise it is much preferable to describing all of one side first, then the other. The two will eventually meet and become one.

Wheeler took matters into his own hands. He sent Iverson's Division after Stoneman. He then sent orders to Harrison to come back and rejoin him at Jonesboro-which is about 17 miles south of Atlanta (at the time) on the Macon and Western Railroad-and ordered Humes to bring the rest of his division there also. Kelly took Dibrell's Brigade and followed Garrard back to the Union lines. Wheeler took his other brigade, Anderson's, with him to Jonesboro.

At Jonesboro the 5th was attacked. The contest was hot with both lines swaying back and forth. Colonel McKenzie sat on his horse with Captain Dave Blevins and Adjutant William Allen, observing the action from a small hill. Even through the din of battle, the small group could hear the dull “thud” of a Minnie ball as it plowed into Captain Blevins arm. “By Jeminy I am wounded,” Blevins cried out. From that time on he was known as “Jeminy Dave.” (Allen)

On Harrison's arrival at Lovejoy's Station he found the Union cavalry in the act of destroying several railroad cars, $400,000 of cotton, salt, and tobacco, and about one mile of track. A battle commenced, from which the Federals withdrew toward Fayetteville, about 6 to 7 miles west of Lovejoy's. However, this retreat was probably due more to the fact that neither Garrard nor Stoneman had yet appeared. Without their cooperation, McCook could not remain where he was.

Receiving reports of the action at Lovejoy's Station, Wheeler made for that place, but found that he was too late. After obtaining reports on which direction McCook was moving, Wheeler sent couriers to find Jackson. Jackson had joined the hunt with Ross' Brigade, and soon took command of Harrison's Brigade near Shake Rag, a small village on the road from Fayetteville to Newnan. Plans were made to have Jackson gain the Federal front, while Wheeler moved in from behind.

At the Flint River he found the bridge destroyed, and confirmation that the enemy was making to re-cross the Chattahoochee. Wheeler arrived at Fayetteville at midnight of the 29th, and discovered that the enemy was about one hour ahead, moving toward Newnan. (This was only one of McCook's columns. There are hints that the force which attacked Jonesboro retreated toward Fairburn, on a direct route toward Campbellton.) At Line Creek the bridge was destroyed and the Union rearguard was barricaded on the opposite bank. Despite this barrier Wheeler managed to drive off the Union troops. He spent another hour repairing the bridge, and continued the pursuit.

All through the night the Union rearguard would stop every few hundred yards, and deliver a volley into Wheeler's column. No doubt the spark of powder briefly illuminating the darkness was the only vision the antagonist had of each other. Finally at 3 a.m. of the 30th Wheeler received word from Jackson that Harrison was now in front of the enemy, who appeared to be resting at Shake Rag.

At daylight Humes charged and routed the Union camp capturing, killing, and wounding over 200 troops. During their retreat Wheeler repeatedly attacked the Union rearguard as they retired toward Newnan. At Newnan McCook's column found Confederate cavalry blocking their path, and was forced to find a route around the town. Another attack on the rearguard captured 20 more prisoners. Croxton's brigade was now cut off from McCook, and surrounded by Ashby in their front, and Wheeler in rear and on their flanks. Ashby and Wheeler both attacked and again routed the disorganized troopers, who at this time wanted nothing more than to reach the Chattahoochee.

However, the pace of the Rebel pursuit had led to a recklessness that almost resulted in disaster. Humes' and Ferguson's portion of the chase (Harrison not with Humes) carried them into a cul-de-sac formed by a loop of the river. This was the grounds of a large plantation. Perhaps not realizing the geography, and hoping to cut off the Federal retreat over the river, these Generals and their men were in turn cut off from Wheeler. Wheeler left Ashby as a lifeline for Humes and Ferguson, and rode to Harrison and Ross, who were just coming from Newnan. Wheeler dismounted the command, leaving their horses behind them. After running some 100 yards they suddenly heard firing in their rear. An unknown portion of McCook's command was now attacking the men who were guarding the horses. Harrison's men were about-faced and returning to their horses, charged the enemy.

Anderson's Brigade finally arrived on the scene, and came up to relieve Humes and Ferguson. In the act of deploying for battle, Anderson was wounded. The brigade attacked without him. The Federals were now in danger of being surrounded themselves. McCook retreated before the next attack. Wheeler resumed his pursuit only a short distance before finding the enemy in battle line in some woods behind a deep ravine. Wheeler divided his command into flanking moves. Discovering his intent, McCook abandoned this position. During this retreat Wheeler struck the column and captured two more regiments. McCook personally led what was left of his command to the confluence of the New River and the Chattahoochee.

During Croxton's retreat, Croxton was separated from his brigade Colonel Brownlow of the Union 1st Tenn. Cavalry took charge of the brigade. These were the men who had attacked Harrison's horses. In their counterattack, Harrison's men drove Brownlow into a grove of pine that was an uncultivated part of the plantation. The 5th then spread out through the woods and hunted them down, man by man. Brownlow rallied what troops he could and made for the river via Flanklin (SW of Newnan).

Wheeler now sent Anderson's Brigade-under Colonel Bird-after McCook, while Harrison with McKenzie's 5th and the 3rd Arkansas were sent in pursuit of Brownlow. Harrison soon moved around to their front and blocked the road they were retreating on. The Federals unlimbered their artillery and unleashed volleys in an attempt to break through. They could not afford to stop however, as Gen. Wheeler now moved in from behind with the rest of Ashby's Brigade. In order to keep moving, the Federals would fire a volley and move the guns forward on the road blocked by the 5th. When they did, McKenzie's men shot the gunners and horses until their artillery was useless. They made several attempts to break through the 5th's line, but only left more dead each time. Other Rebel units began to close in from all directions. Finally, they spiked their cannon, and raised a white flag. The 5th raised the Rebel yell. It traveled in sequence, each regiment picking it up as the sound reached their ears, until the prisoners were engulfed by it.

In accepting their surrender, Wheeler discovered that Brownlow had escaped with a few hundred men. The 5th was sent in pursuit. Sometime after 1 a.m. on the morning of the 31st, McKenzie caught up to Brownlow trying to cross the Chattahoochee. During the night, McKenzie found a guide who took them across the river, and down the opposite bank. Captain Blythe with his Co. B was sent to attack their rear. Though more prisoners were taken, many of Brownlow's men-including Brownlow-removed their shoes and swam the river to avoid capture. About 250 men eventually made it back to their headquarters-all that was left of an entire brigade.

After all was said and done, and the various commands reunited where General Wheeler made camp, Gen. Humes expressed his deep gratitude at having been snatched from the clutches of his enemy. He was all smiles in spite of the fact that he was now wearing an old cotton planters hat. They had taken his black hat, with its plume and silver buckle. (Allen)

The events just described do not do justice to the hardships these men, and their horses, must have endured. To appreciate this aspect one must consider that from July 27th to early on the morning of the 31st, Wheeler's men chased nonstop a larger force, engaging and thoroughly destroying their resistance. I've made no attempt to calculate the number of miles ridden, but one can look at a map from the eastern loop of Atlanta southwest to Jonesboro, Fayetteville, Franklin, and then west to the Chattahoochee.

While the cavalry had been in the midst of what can only be termed an extremely successful counter-campaign, Hood's infantry under S. D. Lee was suffering just the opposite. Sherman had sent Howard's Army of Tennessee (15th, 16th, 17th Corps) from the east side to the west side of Atlanta, as previously mentioned. Hood followed suit shifting his old corps, now under S. D. Lee, and A. P. Stewart's Corps to an area near what was known as Ezra Church (just west of Atlanta). On the 28th, Lee attacked Howard. Unfortunately for the brave Rebels, Howard was ready, entrenched, and gave them a good butt-kicking, to the tune of 3,000 casualties according to some estimates.

It is appropriate here to comment on the recent misfortunes of the Confederate Army of Tennessee. Lee was a good commander. Like many of the corps commanders at this stage of the war, he may have been a little out of his element with a corps instead of a division. His defeat at Ezra Church was only another example of all the good qualities of this army, and all the ways it was misused.

On the other hand, bickering among its commanders, right from President Jefferson Davis on down to its corps commanders, caused an instability that was reflected in its performance. Bravery was wasted many times over for lack of direction, or rather proper direction. This was something the Army of Northern Virginia rarely lacked: stability, and direction.

In the battles for Atlanta, the biggest problem was that the Confederates were now fighting an enemy who had learned to beat them at their own game. Either hit the enemy while moving, unprepared, or march to a strategic position before the other side can get there, entrench, and wait for the enemy to attack you. R. E. Lee was master of both. Johnston showed some these same qualities, with measured success. Sherman had learned to avoid attacking entrenchments. Vice versa, his men learned to entrench everywhere they went. This was because they knew Hood was an attacker. That's why Davis put him in command, to attack. So Sherman always knew what to expect from Hood. In fact, Hood was making Lee-like moves, but Sherman knew to expect it, and he was always too late. By the time his men got in position to attack, the Yankees had entrenched in good defensive positions. Hood learned nothing from his time with Lee. Lee's motto was to put his men in a position with the most advantages, to give them the highest possible chance to win. In the only times he failed to do this, Malvern Hill and Gettysburg, he paid the price. Hood's men were never given any advantages at all. They were brave, but so were the Yankees.

After McCook was chased back over the Chattahoochee, Humes Division was ordered to picket in front of Lee's men, who were still licking their wounds from the Ezra Church debacle. Sherman was still trying to extend his line west. Humes took up a position first on North Utoy Creek, on the Union right flank, but this offended the Yankees, who drove him back to the south bank of Utoy Creek. Near this point the Rebel line ended, but to his back was a roughly prepared trench line, unmanned at the time, that curved south to the railroad at East Point. This line protected the railroad to East Point, but there weren't enough infantry to man the entire length. The cavalry defended this position until Schofield pushed them back to a line running from Camp Creek on their left to the trenches on their right.

The above movements took place in the first week of August. William Allen gives a very interesting and colorful account of another raid on the Macon Railroad at Jonesboro by General Kilpatrick in this same time frame. However, it is utterly impossible, for the records clearly prove that the Union Cavalry was nowhere near Jonesboro at the time. I believe by the detail he so vividly recalls, the event Mr. Williams described actually happened. Unfortunately, without knowing where in timethe event actually belongs I cannot relate it to the reader as actual history of the 5th.

Let us pick up somewhere around the 10th of August. Even before Wheeler had finished dealing with the Union cavalry's double envelopment, Hood had plans for him to make another raid into Tennessee, but the condition of his men and horses made it impossible to do so right away. Nevertheless, he began collecting his command to the east of Atlanta, and moved out with a column of about 4,000 men. They first struck the railroad a few miles north of Marietta, then Cassville, then Calhoun. On August 14th Humes and Kelly captured Dalton. At Dalton there was some trouble trying to keep discipline, as the hungry Rebels wondered off to load up on supplies. What they couldn't carry, they burned. Leaving Dalton the next day, they stopped to feast on their captured booty. They finished just in time before being attacked by a Negro infantry brigade from General Steedman's command. The 5th was driven into a muddy stretch of woods, but regained their horses, and simply rode around this obstacle.

With the vast majority of his command, Wheeler now left the railroad for East Tennessee. Humes' Division moved in front. The command was broken up into smaller detachments, each with an assignment to cut telegraph wires, break up railroad, capture supply dumps, or important bridges. To give the details of this part of the expedition would be redundant. Suffice it to say that the Federals had guards that had to be dealt with at each bridge. At each water crossing there were skirmishes, but in the face of larger resistance other crossing points would be sought out.

More significant is the human-interest side of things, as those of the Southern sympathies in East Tennessee were under much distress since the retreat to Chattanooga. This was the first time the men of the 5th had been back to East Tennessee since almost a year to the day. When near Athens, Colonel McKenzie decided to let several companies go by their homes to see their families. At the home of one Mrs. Buckner, mother of Capt. Buckner, Co. I, 3rd Tennessee, the beleaguered woman was found without food except some watermelons she had hidden. Upon seeing the friendly Confederates she rolled these out to share with them. They in turn shared with her some of the food taken at Dalton. She was beside herself with joy at their visit. (Allen)

Unknown to these war weary soldiers, since their last visit, there developed nearby at a place called Hunter's Bluff, a large logging camp of about 300 Negroes, bossed by a corpulent figure by the name of “Old Dad”. Old Dad had gathered around him an Ohio company, augmented by many deserters from both sides, commanded by a Captain Enoch Collins, as a camp guard. These men had set up quite a little fiefdom for themselves, and anyone who lived in the area, or came near, was liable to be robbed at their whim. Upon hearing that Confederates had moved into the area and were making for their homes, they began patrolling and looking for Rebels they could turn in to Union authorities for bounty money. Lieutenant J. M. McKenzie of Co. I, 5th Tennessee, was arrested at his home, betrayed by Confederate deserters. Others were captured on the roads. Citizens began warning the men of their plight, and some took to hiding.

A couple of days later, Colonel McKenzie and Captain Lillard reformed those not captured, and set out to free the men who were being held at Old Dad's camp. They attacked the camp as Old Dad's men were eating breakfast. Collins' men put up a brief fight, killing one and seriously wounding another, but soon fled in fear of what McKenzie's men might do to them. The Negroes also must have been in fear for their lives, or at the very least that they would be returned to slavery, for many began jumping off the bluff into the Tennessee River. Surely some of these men died, and perhaps some made it across or downriver. Old Dad was captured. The prisoners were released from a log corn crib just as a Union steamer was coming up the river to take them back to Knoxville. (Allen) Needless to say, they were probably a very happy bunch. As for Old Dad, I don't know what happened to him, and though I could make some poignant speculation on his fate, I will leave that to your own imagination.

The 5th then left their old homes and rejoined Wheeler's column. There was some trouble finding a place to cross the Tennessee River, which was swollen by recent rains. This was done after marching in a roundabout fashion. At the Holston River they met some resistance in trying to cross. Before crossing the Holston, and at Williams' request, Wheeler allowed Williams to take his brigade, and much of the artillery, to capture a garrison and bridge at Strawberry Plains.

The balance of the command moved on to cut the railroad at several places between Nashville and Chattanooga, including capturing the depot at McMinnville-again. They moved from McMinnville to Murfreesboro. On this leg of the trip many men fell asleep in their saddle. Their unguided, and probably just as tired, horses would come to a stop creating a traffic jam back along the whole column. Wheeler left Dibbrell's Brigade and Col. Anderson's 4th TN of Harrison's Brigade to deal with Murfreesboro, while he continued toward Nashville.

Near Nashville the column was attacked by General Rousseau, but a counter attack by Harrison's brigade opened the way to continue their destructive path. During this time, Wheeler had been frantically trying to get Williams to rejoin the main column. However, Williams became more entangled in his fruitless adventure in East Tennessee than Wheeler would have liked. In trying to catch up to Wheeler, Williams came upon the scene at Murfreesboro. There, Williams, Dibbrell, and Anderson decided to attack the city. Several charges were unsuccessful. All the while, Wheeler was moving farther away from Nashville, so it was decided to quit the business of taking Murfreesboro. There was disagreement about what to do next. Anderson moved on to catch up with Wheeler, but Williams and Dibbrell probably felt this was a dangerous undertaking considering the distance between them and Wheeler. With the Federals trying to concentrate against Wheeler, they decided to return to East Tennessee. Dibbrell had many men from East Tennessee who stayed behind to visit family, and he was anxious to bring them back into his fold. (In his defense, if he had continued with Wheeler to Alabama, chances are these men would never have returned to him.)

However, Wheeler was furious with Williams. To begin with, he was leery of Williams' plan to capture Strawberry Plains, and destroy the RR bridge, and only agreed under the belief that Williams would do it quickly and catch up. He not only took too long in this effort, but the it was unsuccessful. Then Williams failed to respond to several messages for him to hurry up. Wheeler felt like if Williams was unable to reunite then it was his own fault. Wheeler could have let this go with small mention, but Williams rubbed salt in the wound by remaining in East Tennessee after the main column returned to Atlanta. (Allen claims Williams was a whiskey drinking man, and hints that this was an ever present problem with his ability as a commander. He also makes other unfavorable remarks about his men, which I will not repeat.)

Wheeler's raid resulted in the usual destruction of Union supplies and rail lines, but by this time in the war the Confederate cavalry was no longer able to wield their scythe behind the lines at will. One indication of this was the action taken by the officers who returned to East Tennessee. Another was the toll taken on Wheeler's officer corps. General Kelly was killed near Franklin. Lieutenants Warren, Staples, and Lowery of his own staff were also killed. Lt. Hudson, his aide-de-camp, Major Wailes, his asst. adjutant-general, and Lt. Bellinger, his signal officer, were wounded by his side. That so much of his staff was affected is an indication that Wheeler himself was being forced to take a more significant role in operations; a role not normal for a Major General, that would normally be left to others-who did not now exist.

Back at Atlanta, Sherman left Slocum's Corps to guard his own rail line, and moved his armies well to the southwest, and then due east in order to permanently cut the southern railroads supplying the city. Without Wheeler's cavalry, Hood was powerless to stop him, though Hardee made a valiant effort at Jonesboro. On September 1st the Confederate army began evacuating Atlanta.

Humes marched southeast trying to reach Hood, but now with Sherman's main force between them he found the Chattahoochee blocked at Campbellsville. Hood had moved east of the city, away from Humes. Hardee, though defeated at Jonesboro, had managed to secure a position at Lovejoy's Station. A few days later Hood and Sherman agreed on a truce to allow the citizens of Atlanta time to evacuate. In that time Hood moved to Lovejoy Station, but Humes was still in West Georgia where he finally reunited with Wheeler.

Due to the loss of Atlanta, the chaos that ensued, movements of Wheeler's cavalry in September of '64 are difficult to trace, but this is the best that I can determine. Wheeler moved his command into Alabama to rehabilitate his horses. He moved again to Iuka, Mississippi, where the situation must have been severe as he made appeals to Hood's quartermaster department for horseshoes, and could not move for several days until he got them. After 4 days in Iuka he moved back into Alabama, to a place called Blue Springs Cove. (There are 6 places currently named Blue Springs in Alabama. I believe the one mentioned here is just to the southeast of Birmingham.) Some of his troops had remained in Tennessee, still striking at the lines of communication-de-facto cooperating with Forrest-and General Williams was still cut off from Wheeler. Others were spread out trying to gain forage for their animals.

Hood planned to extend his left flank northwest to the Chattahoochee, and wanted Wheeler to join Jackson's cavalry on the north bank. These instructions were sent on Sept. 13th, but by the 20th Wheeler was still unable to consolidate his troops for organized movement. On that day both Forrest and Wheeler met at Tuscumbia, Alabama, and communicated with Hood, desiring to unite their commands for an expedition into Middle Tennessee already approved for Forrest. In his communication, Wheeler told Hood he could not return by a direct route, and that he would only be able to bring about 2,000 men. This was an optimistic report.

“His command is in a demoralized state. He claims to have about 2,000 men with him; his adjutant general however says he will not be able to raise and carry back with him more than 1,000, and in all probability not over 500 . . . and his whole command is demoralized to such an extent that he expresses himself as disheartened, and that having lost influence with his troops and being unable to secure the aid and cooperation of his officers he believes it to the interest of the service that he should be relieved of command, . . . General Wheeler has turned over to me what is left of my old brigade, numbering 60 men.”

Sixty men left from a whole brigade. These words were powerful, yet insightful as they were, Hood was un-phased. On the 23rd he denied permission to join Forrest's raid and ordered Wheeler to move toward him, striking the Chattanooga railroad as he came, and join him near Palmetto. Such was also the state of Hood's army, and his mental state, that he refused to acknowledge the reality before him.

Hood was desperate for Wheeler's cavalry because he had already determined that the only way to stop Sherman from going any farther was to strike against his lines of communication with his entire force. For this reason he was moving everyday by his left flank, sliding to the west, and then north. He needed Wheeler, and Wheeler obeyed as best as he could.

Before leaving however, General Hardee was relieved from command of his corps by mutual agreement. These two men didn't get along from the beginning. Hardee felt slighted by Davis when he promoted Hood over him as army commander. Beyond that, he felt like Hood had senselessly sacrificed the lives of many men in reckless attacks. The affair at Jonesboro was the straw that broke the camel's back, and Hardee asked for a transfer to the South Carolina District. This incident would have important ramifications later. (Briefly: In my opinion Hardee had a right to be upset. He was much more ready for army command that Hood, and was an integral part of the Army of Tennessee, while Hood was considered an outsider.)

Sherman was watching Hood, and when Hood tried to strike the line near Allatoona, north of Atlanta, the 4th Corps was there. At this point, Hood wanted no part of a major battle. He now turned northeast to Rome where he planned to strike the railroad at Kingston (Ga), but the Federals had followed him there. He then moved around this force and made quickly for Dalton, which he reached successfully on October 13th. Of course much destruction of the railroad occurred here, but he didn't hang around long. Union reinforcements-albeit many were raw recruits-had garrisoned all the towns along the railroad from Nashville to Chattanooga.

Wheeler left Hood's immediate vicinity near Kingston, and rode back into East Tennessee. Harrison's Brigade made a threatening move toward Knoxville, but this was probably just a feint to divert attention from Wheeler's main column. With Ashby's Brigade and one of Kelly's brigades, Wheeler turned back to the west and damaged the railroad at Cleveland, and north of Chattanooga. From there, Humes was ordered to link up with A. P. Stewart's Corps at Rocky Face Ridge.

From Gadsden, Hood moved to Tuscumbia, where he planned to cross the Tennessee River, move north and attack Nashville. Wheeler was to follow, protecting the army's right and rear. On the 26th he was attacked by infantry and cavalry from Georgia, and retreated back to Gadsden. Previously, Hood had ordered two of Ashby's regiments to join the army for temporary assignment to Forrest, who was to take over the cavalry duties for the army. Once this was accomplished, they returned to Wheeler in east Alabama.

In the first week of November, Ashby's Brigade was attacked by Union cavalry on the north bank of the Coosa River. The men were still much jaded by the many miles they put on, and were driven back against the river. With nowhere to go, they began swimming on their horses over the river. The water was cold, and the current so swift the horses could not get a foothold on the opposite bank, which was steep, and were swept down river. Wheeler ordered a detail, formed of the good swimmers, to tie 4 or 5 horses together, and take them over-one leading each pack. These men had to swim the river many times before they were all across. They picketed the south bank of the Coosa just long enough to make sure the Federals didn't cross over.

Wheeler moved his cavalry from Alabama to LaGrange, Ga., then to Jonesboro. For several days in mid-November Wheeler sent reports to all of his principal superiors on what was happening in Atlanta. On the 11th he reported seeing fires that lasted for three days. On the 15th Sherman's army moved out of Atlanta toward Macon, beginning his famous “March to the Sea.” Wheeler skirmished with the lead elements at Bear Creek, before falling back to Lovejoy's Station. From there he was forced back to Griffin.

In the mean time, Hardee had been given command over all the troops in Southeastern Georgia and South Carolina. He had been scraping together a motley collection of Georgia militia, stragglers from Hood, and coastal garrisons to form some kind of organized resistance. As Wheeler tried to slow Sherman's advance, Hardee was sending these troops to defend Macon. Wheeler and Hardee joined forces at Macon on the 19th. The next day during a reconnaissance to Clinton, Wheeler's column ran smack into Osterhaus' Corps moving through a dense fog. There were several moments of confusion during which time six of Wheeler's men charged into the town and captured one of Osterhaus' staff. There followed a series of charge, counter-charge exchanges that briefly stunted the Federal advance.

Wheeler now heard that Macon was being threatened from another direction and returned there in time to find the artillery blasting away, having already left Union dead in front of the breastworks. However, he soon discovered there were not enough infantry to cover the entire line, and placed Harrison's and Hagan's brigades in the defenses. The remainder of the 20th was spent in light skirmishing.

It was soon discovered that a large force had turned away from Macon and was marching to Milledgeville. Wheeler made for the Oconee River and on the 25th crossed just ahead of the 14th and 20th Corps. Unknown to the Confederates, it was Sherman's intent to confuse them by spreading out his three corps (actually 4: 3 in front, with the 14th Corps following) on a sixty-mile wide front, moving by different roads. By sending columns toward both Augusta and Savannah, the Confederates were unable to determine his true intent, and could not concentrate their meager forces.

Hardee ordered Wheeler to Sandersville, where he would be within reach of both the road to Augusta and the road to Savannah. However, the 20th Corps-with cavalry in front-did not continue on to Augusta, but turned from Milledgeville toward Sandersville. Wheeler was attacked three miles from the town, but a determined counterattack brought them to a halt (probably thinking Wheeler was screening a larger force). On the morning of the 26th Union infantry drove Wheeler through and out of Sandersville.

That evening he received word that General Judson Kilpatrick's cavalry division was moving toward Augusta. Leaving Iverson's Division in the front of 20th Corps, Wheeler took the balance in pursuit of Kilpatrick. About midnight he hit the Union troopers as they rested, and drove them from their camp. Despite this, Kilpatrick continued on toward Augusta. All through the day, Wheeler attacked his rearguard at every attempted stand, about every 200 to 300 yards. Kilpatrick was slowed at Brier Creek Swamp, and Wheeler now attacked him in earnest. As the guns blazed and sabers rattled in his rear, Kilpatrick realized he could not cross the creek safely. Instead, he turned off the Augusta road toward Waynesboro, where arlier he had sent about 500 men to destroy a railroad bridge there.

As they moved, Kilpatrick's men began burning farms along the road, but Wheeler was so close behind that he was able to put many of these out, and pressed the enemy so hard that they often did not have time to get a fire started. At Waynesboro they set fire to the town, and left in a hurry. Wheeler arrived just after dark by the light of these fires, and set to work extinguishing them. When convinced that the fires were in hand, he continued the pursuit. He attacked Kilpatrick as his men were tearing up the railroad outside of town, causing them to abandon their demolition work.

At 3 a.m. of the 28th Wheeler sent Humes to the left, and another regiment to the right of Kilpatrick's column, in hopes of pinching off the rear units. For whatever reason-tired, unfamiliar with the terrain, etc.-these units failed to reach their position in time before the Union rearguard slipped through the trap. A fog developed before dawn, and covered Kilpatrick's withdrawal, putting some space between the foes.

Wheeler moved on through the fog when he found Kilpatrick had turned to face him. The Union troopers charged. Their emergence from the fog was a ghastly scene, and would have greatly disturbed the faint of heart. But these Rebel veterans had seen hell before. After the initial shock, the Federals were repulsed. Kilpatrick moved on. Wheeler again attempted his previous tactic of sending Humes to one flank and Anderson to the other, while Wheeler attacked the front. This time the move was entirely successful owing to Kilpatrick's static defense. The Union troopers broke when they realized they were being hit in both flanks. Many prisoners were taken, but though surrounded, many more refused to surrender and in the heat of the chase were shot down in flight. There is no doubt that a good portion of these men were killed unnecessarily. However, there is equally no doubt that the rebel cavalrymen were angry over the Yankees pyromania, and when the opportunity presented itself this anger was vented through extracurricular bloodshed.

The chase wasn't over. The previous scene was repeated at the next creek, with flanking and frontal charges, the Union position overrun, and prisoners taken. By now the Union flight was so swift that Kilpatrick managed to cross Buckhead Creek far enough ahead of Wheeler that he was prepared to burn the bridge upon his approach. Wheeler had sent the 4th Tennessee ahead to try and prevent this, but they were too late. When Wheeler arrived the bridge was on fire. Union troops blasting away from the opposite bank prevented the Rebels from immediately trying to save the bridge.

The delay at Buckhead Creek allowed Kilpatrick to rally his men for another stand a few miles away. Wheeler formed for battle on open ground with Dibbrell, Harrison, and Ashby; some in line, some in column. The bugle sounded, and the Rebels hurled themselves with such fury against the Union line that they were crushed under its weight. Kilpatrick had already formed a second line in some woods too thick for mounted men. Encountering this difficulty, Ashby was ordered to pass around their left flank, and gain the Louisville (Ga) road-the road Kilpatrick was moving on (Louisville is due west of Waynesboro). Unfortunately, in the gathering dusk Ashby got on the wrong road, but sent Wheeler a note that he was in the position Wheeler wanted. This error allowed Kilpatrick to escape without serious harm.

Kilpatrick made it back to Louisville, where he met the 14th Corps. On Dec. 2nd this combined forced march on Waynesboro. Wheeler checked their advance at Rocky Creek, but owing to their large numbers, they were able to quickly build another bridge farther down and gain his flank, forcing him to retreat. The 14th Corps began tearing up track as they moved, and Wheeler tried to stop them, but each success was only temporary. Even at night the work did not stop, so that Wheeler felt compelled to periodically shell their camp through the night.

On the 4th Wheeler engaged lead elements of Kilpatrick and the 14th Corps in what was a hot contest for Waynesboro proper. The Confederate cavalry fought off repeated charges outside and west of the town. Countercharges left more dead on the field before running into the bristling lines of infantry. Thus distracted, the Union lines were lengthening with rear units coming up, and eventually outflanked Wheeler. He retired through the town, and took up a position to block the road to Augusta.

Savannah, not Augusta, was Sherman's goal. From Waynesboro the 14th Corps turned south toward Millen. As it moved, Wheeler dashed in on its flanks and rear, tearing out anything left straying too far from the main column. The rearguard began constructing barricades for protection, while Kilpatrick would charge the Rebels in an effort to buy some relief.

On the night of the 8th Wheeler again shelled their camp in the dark, and though there is good reason to doubt his claim that the entire corps left their camp so hurriedly that they abandoned their camp equipment, it is true that they left much behind. In this rubble Wheeler found a dispatch from General Slocum to General Davis (commanding the 14th Corps) describing Sherman's exact location before Savannah, and this was forwarded to Hardee. Arriving within ten miles of the city, Wheeler realized he could not help Hardee, who was now pinned up in Savannah, and crossed the Savannah River into South Carolina.

Savannah was not a defendable city-not for the size of Hardee's force of no more than 20,000, including cavalry-with the Union Navy on one side and Sherman's 60,000 on the other. The only way out was over the Savannah River, and these crossings were in danger of being cut off by the navy. On the 20th, before this could be done, Hardee withdrew from the city. Sherman marched into Savannah the next day.

We are now in the final phase of the war. What has been traditionally known as “The Carolinas Campaign” was hardly worthy of that distinction. The result was a forgone conclusion. That it would be four more months before the final curtain fell was due more to Sherman's need to rest and re-supply his men by sea. This required clearing the harbor of torpedoes and other obstructions, making specific plans for occupying the State of South Carolina, and finally, engineering his way through the water logged terrain.

Sherman's particular dislike for South Carolina is well documented, and should be familiar to anybody with Southern ancestry, so space is not needed here for this subject. It is enough to say that when he moved north, the Confederate army would not be his main target, but rather the state itself. The march through Georgia was a mad haphazard rush to the sea, and without supplies the men naturally fed off the surrounding homesteads. That is what made reaching the coast so important. The Carolinas Campaign would be different. Sherman would fill his wagons, and re-supply them from secure points along the coast. For this reason he could take his time, concentrate on thoroughly destroying the state, and fight his battles also.

After retreating across the Savannah River, Hardee and Wheeler began withdrawing heavy guns that were supposed to keep the Union navy out, from the riverbank to keep them from being captured. They then spent most of their time trying to build defenses at various crossing points farther north and patrolling the coast. The Federals began landing troops on the South Carolina coast, requiring Hardee's men to abandon the Savannah line.

Humes' Division spent the balance of December 1864, and all of January 1865 on a line from Hardeeville to Pocotaligo, South Carolina (see IH95 on map). On Jan. 24th Colonel McKenzie reported that he captured three prisoners of the 17th Corps near Pocotaligo, and that the 15th Corps was at Beaufort (this wing commanded by O. Howard). The 14th and 20th Corps were still in Savannah.

January was rather quiet while Sherman prepared for his next move, except within the Confederate ranks. Several complaints were made by civilians, both in Georgia and in South Carolina, concerning the discipline of Wheeler's cavalry. Wheeler was very defensive to these charges claiming that because many of the perpetrators were mounted, civilians just assumed they were under his command. However, in South Carolina he did admit that some of his officers were negligent in their discipline, and in a rebuttal to General Bragg he named names. It is to Wheeler's credit, and in his defense, that when certain officers came up for promotion, he flatly denied it, stating that their commands were giving him trouble. In the same letter he took the time to praise Allen and Humes for being, “brave, subordinate, and withal good disciplinarians.” He went on to state that, “While they have been in command of my divisions I have had thus far good success, and not a single reverse.” True or not, at least this is an indication that men of the 5th were well behaved at a time when discipline was breaking down throughout the Confederacy due to its declining fortunes.

Also during January, the food situation became critical. Humes was informed by his subordinate officers they would have to fall back 10 or 15 miles to find food and forage for their horses. This was done by a system of rotation, which left the picket lines much weakened. However, the men did manage to diversify their diet with some fresh oysters now and then. That did not help the horses. Some of the men were forced to ride mules as the horses simply broke down, and were unable to be replaced.

Several events took place in the first week of February: Sherman's Corps began their march into the South Carolina interior; Beauregard-that man whose name seems to be one of the most notable icons of the Confederacy, yet who never really found a niche in this war-was ordered to South Carolina, again (He had already been there before, working to improve Charleston's defenses); and finally, Lee was given command of all Confederate armies-too late.

As in Georgia, without a significant and organized army, there was very little anybody could do to stop Sherman. Even Wheeler's vaunted cavalry was reduced to the nuisance of a gnat. While the South still had many Generals available to lead men, there were few men to be led. Several of the South's best known generals were sent to South Carolina-Beauregard, Bragg, McLaws, Johnston, Hampton, Smith(actually in Augusta commanding Georgia state troops but part of the SC campaign)-as if rank could make up for the lack of infantry. In truth, most of these men had not been terribly successful when they had more resources than were now available; what was to make anyone believe they could stop Sherman with far less? (Like Hood, Lafayette McLaws and Wade Hampton had known glory and success while with Lee's army, but by 1865 it was far too late for a few talented individuals to make a difference.) To their credit, they tried, as if their fate was not a forgone conclusion.

The plan had worked so well in Georgia that Sherman continued his strategy of advancing in two large wings-two corps each-in such a way as to threaten two or more objectives. This is one reason why the South had so many Generals trying to defend all the possible objectives, instead of concentrating their fragmented strength into something respectable. The cavalry laying down a screen between Sherman and the Confederate infantry was also scattered, due partly to the reason noted earlier, that they could not find enough food in any concentrated area.

As Sherman advanced his two wings from Savannah and Beaufort, Humes and the other cavalry commanders desperately tried to slow him down using every guerrilla tactic they knew-not being strong enough to directly confront them-and supply the various infantry commanders with information as to where he was going (Augusta, Columbia or Charleston?).

General Lafayette McLaws had an infantry division covering Branchville. Humes Division was between the Savannah and Salkehatchie Rivers. The 5th was posted on a large rice plantation when Sherman began his Carolinas Campaign. As usual, the cavalry was the first to exchange lead. Humes reported 10 or 12 men badly wounded before crossing the Salkehatchie. Burning the bridges there, they fell back to the Edisto River. Humes camped at Midway on Feb. 4th.

When it was learned that Kilpatrick's cavalry was marching before Sherman's left wing, toward Augusta, Wheeler decided to concentrate his cavalry against him at Aiken (a few miles out side of Augusta) where he had some time back left Iverson's Division. The Rebel cavalry aggressively attacked and drove back the lead Federal units. Warned by this initial assault, Kilpatrick prepared a strong defensive position for his main column. Wheeler boldly charged again, but this time suffered a painful rebuke from the well-prepared Union line. Wheeler retreated east toward Columbia. Humes retreated north, and on February 17th spent the day trying to cross the Saluda River.

Kilpatrick claimed that after this fight, Wheeler's men were more disheartened than before, and began disserting the cause in notable numbers. There was probably some truth to this, but muster records indicate that his claim is misleading. Be that as it may, one thing is certain. Whereas before, Union commanders spoke of the Rebel cavalry with awe and a healthy respect, Kilpatrick's words now reflected a supreme and genuine confidence. After Aiken he disdainfully stated that he no longer feared Wheeler, even Wheeler and Hampton together (Wade Hampton now had overall command of the cavalry, but he mostly remained with Butler's division from his old command).

Companies A, B, and I of the 5th, about 122 men, were not with Humes at the Aiken fight. They had a more adventurous time. The advance of Sherman's left wing threatened to get in the rear of General McLaws. These companies, led by Major W. G. Allen, were ordered to assist General McLaws in his retreat to Columbia. Federal Cavalry had taken a bridge over the Orange River that McLaws needed to evacuate his wagons. Arriving at Branchville, McLaws ordered Allen to take and hold the bridge until his wagons were safely away. Captain Lillard's Company I struck the enemy first, driving their pickets back to the bridge. Captain Blythe's Company B fell in line, whereupon Capt. Lillard then ordered Cat. Blythe to charge and take the bridge. When Allen rode up to the scene with Company A, he found the two men in a heated argument over which one of them was the ranking officer. Allen ended any doubt, and ordered Capt. Reagan to take the bridge. (Allen)

They did take and hold the bridge, while McLaws' infantry and wagons moved down the road to Columbia. McLaws was supposed to send word back when they were far enough away for the cavalry to fall in line as the rearguard. For whatever reason, this message never came, or didn't come in time. Eventually Union cavalry closed in on the bridge from the same road the infantry had escaped on. Allen was cut off from the main column, and was forced to retreat by another route. (Allen)

Unable to move north, Allen marched the men east, toward the Santee, and roughly parallel to the coast. Now the rains came. Their route was through lowlands, whose rivers and creeks were easily swamped by rain and the ocean tides. It poured. The fields became shallow seas all around. They didn't dare stray from the middle of the road, or man and horse would slide into the water on either side. Finally they came to a hamlet where the citizens had fled from their homes-no doubt having heard of Sherman's dislike for their state. Here, having occupied the vacated residences, dry from the deluge outside, and having also found some whiskey, they spent the next two days in merriment-or what would have to pass for merriment under the circumstances. (Allen)

On the third morning Allen gave the order to fall in and move out. Evidently, Private James T. Howard of Co. I was still drunk and refused. Capt. Lillard order Lieutenant Blevins to put Howard on his horse, and tie his feet together so he wouldn't fall off. Blevins refused to do this, and Lillard had him arrested. Now the scene turned ugly. Lillard finally got some of the men to hold Howard, so Lillard himself could tie his feet together. This was more than some of Co. I could take. Pistols were drawn, and the sound of hammers cocking got Lillard's attention. He thrust out his chest, and dared the men to shoot him. Just then, Major Allen came up with Soloman Warick from Co. A., and calmed the men. All except Tom Moorland, who cocked his gun as if to call the bluff, but Warick quickly knocked his arm up so that the shot went into the air. (Allen)

Meanwhile, Wheeler was confronting the left wing. Hampton was with Butler's cavalry division, and Beauregard was near Columbia. As Sherman advanced against the state capitol with his right wing it became apparent to Beauregard that they could not defend the city. He withdrew to Winnsboro several miles north. Hampton's cavalry stayed behind as the rearguard, pulling out just ahead of Sherman's arrival.

I should state here that this narrative cannot do justice to the events surrounding Sherman's march through South Carolina. As already stated, the subject would require too much space, and is well documented in other sources. However, since members of the 5th were witnesses to this emotional and historical event, it can't be totally ignored. Two items of note come to mind. Burning was of such an extent that Sherman could track the progress of Kilpatrick and his left wing by its smoke during the day, and the orange glow of burning pine trees by night. Secondly, it is Sherman's claim that Columbia was burnt more by Hampton's cavalry setting fire to the town's cotton, than through any work of his own men. Regardless of this claim, it is also true that Sherman had already ordered everything in Columbia not needed by his army to be destroyed. It makes little difference who did it, if it was going to happen anyway.

Remember Hood? Wheeler had left him at the Tennessee River in late October of '64, with the bulk of the Army of Tennessee. Sherman had sent George Thomas's army back to deal with Hood before he embarked on his march to Savannah. The move worked. In December Hood launched futile attacks against fortified works at Franklin and Nashville. Thousands of brave soldiers and officers, including the vaunted Patrick Cleburne, came to rest on the cold, hard, winter ground of Tennessee.

Mass demoralization, resulting in desertion and straggling, now overtook the Army of Tennessee. Of the slightly less than 40,000 men Hood took north, less than 20,000 made camp at the end of their retreat to Mississippi. Before returning to South Carolina, Beauregard had gone to inspect Hood's army and was shocked at its appearance. What he saw before him didn't make a good corps, much less an army.

The suggestion was made at the time that these troops should be transported to South Carolina. Desperate as the situation was in South Carolina, Beauregard was against their transfer, believing they would not survive the trip in their condition. Beauregard's rejection of 10,000-15,000 badly needed troops vividly reflects the depths to which this once so proud Army of Tennessee had sunk. Nevertheless 3,000 of S. D. Lee's Corps left for South Carolina at the same time as Beauregard. The two corps of A. P. Stewart and B. F. Cheatham, were transferred later-a feat in itself, given the logistics. Between them they brought perhaps 8,000 men.

Lee's men did not arrive in time to be employed before Columbia was evacuated. Cheatham and Stewart only arrived in time to rendezvous with Lee's Corps (commanded by Stevenson temporarily) near the point of retreat at Newberry, South Carolina. Though it appeared in Mississippi that these men were spiritually broken, they marched through the town of Camden singing along with a bold and lanky stride that seemed to hide any hint of past failures-for in truth the failure was not theirs. The scene was touching to citizens who thought the war was over.

Conceding the loss not only of Columbia, but of all South Carolina, Charleston was evacuated. Beauregard ordered Hardee's men, and the remnants of the Army of Tennessee to assemble in North Carolina. All Confederate units in South Carolina now made a rapid march for the North Carolina border. By Feb. 22th Wheeler, with Humes and Allen (W. W. Allen, not to be confused with William G. Allen) came to rest just to the north of Lancaster, which was occupied shortly thereafter by Kilpatrick. Hampton was to the west, at Rock Hill. They believed at the time that Sherman was heading for Charlotte.

While at Lancaster there occurred an exchange between Wheeler and Kilpatrick that sheds light on the otherwise darker aspects of their war. Kilpatrick complained to Wheeler that on the 21st, eight of his men, after surrendering as prisoners were murdered by Wheeler's Texans, using Spencer carbines. The same day, nine more were found in different places, two with their throats cut “ear to ear.” He warned Wheeler that an equal number of Rebel prisoners would be executed, and every house within reach burned if he did not provide a satisfactory response.

Wheeler claimed that the described men could not have been his, neither of his two Texas regiments were engaged on the 21st, nor did they carry Spencers. While Wheeler promised to investigate, he also warned Kilpatrick in turn, and the conversation turned ugly. Kilpatrick then revealed that his information was reliable, as it came from one of his scouts (spy, more like) who had slipped in amongst the Texans (This was evidently a common practiced of both sides). The spy also reported that the Texans swore to take no prisoners from that point on. Wheeler's claim that his men didn't carry Spencers would seem true enough, given the normal weaponry of Rebel cavalry, however it is possible that these men could have taken the Spencers from prisoners, and dead Union troops, who certainly did use the Spencer.

More than likely the story is true, but I don't know whether Wheeler ever condoned such a policy. After this banter, the two men did manage to come to an agreement for exchanging prisoners-cavalry, that is. That these two enemies would make an agreement that was prohibited by both governments, was an indication of the special relationship and respect the cavalry had for each other. Theirs was a different war. Because the same units tended to face each other over long periods of time and over hundreds of miles, they came to know each other better than the infantry.

Returning to Major Allen's Battalion, they continued their saga through the still boggy South Carolina lowlands toward Florence. (Probably along what is now IH95) Before reaching that city, they again found more whiskey. In what could now be seen as an ill advised move, but probably at the time was an effort to appease men who were still angry with Captain Lillard, Major Allen knocked the heads out of three barrels. Every man that was a drinker had their fill. Some lay on the ground and lapped it up out of the wagon ruts. A belligerent state ensued, and Major Allen had to send Capt. Lillard away from camp, until the next day, for his own safety. However, the captain's brother, James, tried to shoot Marshall Lewis who was issuing rations at the time. Before all was said and done, Allen had arrested and disarmed 16 men. They were barricaded in a corn crib until they could sleep it off. The next day many of the men were sorry for the their behavior.

Allen moved the men to Florence, South Carolina. There they found the heavy ordinance evacuated from Charleston being ferried across the PeeDee River by a unit of home guardsmen, made up of elderly men from the area. This undertaking took precedence, and it would be two days before anyone else could be carried over. They rested until that time, but on the morning they were to cross, they heard the sound of guns coming from the road to Darlington (maybe 8 miles north of dt Florence). General Wilson's Union cavalry had cut the road north from Florence and were pushing for that town. Allen's men were trapped. The Pee Dee wasn't fordable. Union infantry were moving up from the south, and their cavalry were blocking the north route. The home guards formed for battle on a small rise before Wilson's troops.

Allen and his company commanders held council. They determined to cut their way through Wilson to the north. Soon thereafter, Wilson's men drove the home guards off the ridge in front of Allen. Allen formed his 120 men in a column of fours for a charge. With weapons drawn, they gave the Rebel yell, galloped forward, and broke through the Yankee line. The road to Darlington cut through a ridge, where it narrowed so the column was forced to pass through by twos. Major Allen and Pvt. J. C. Smith were at the head. (There is some question as to whether Allen was on the wagon road, or the railroad passing through this cut, but they evidently made separate, yet parallel cuts very near each other through the ridge.) More Union troopers waited across the railroad on the other side. These troops fired a volley into the defile. One ball hit Smith's mule full in the head, instantly dropping the unfortunate animal in his tracks. Another missile planted itself in the breast of Allen's horse, who fell next to Smith's mule. The path was now blocked. The column stacked up behind, in danger of being mowed down as they stood. Captain Reagan, next behind Allen, leapt down, and helped pull Allen's horse aside. The men bravely pushed through the new opening as bullets whizzed by. Filing out on the other side, Capt. Lillard rushed ahead yelling, “Come on you cowardly rascals.” (Allen) The column now formed by fours again, and charged ahead. That night they rested beyond Darlington, on the Darlington to Cheraw road.

The next morning, about 40 Negroes came from Darlington, sent there evidently by some unscrupulous Yankees to rob its citizens under the promise of being given horses when they returned. They came out expecting to meet their Yankee friends, but instead were surprised by Allen's pickets, and were arrested. The Negroes were rounded up, and forced to empty their hats and pockets of their booty, mostly jewelry. Allen had these men whipped. Moving back to the town square, he made arrangements to have the jewelry returned to its owners. The grateful citizens showed their appreciation by cooking the men a breakfast they hadn't had in a long time. One lucky soldier met his future bride there that morning.

After crossing the Pee Dee, they moved north, crossed into North Carolina, and came to the town of Maxton. (They had taken a circuitous route around Cheraw, up IH95, then west on either Hwy 501 or 74) The advance had just stopped to make camp for the night, when a column of Federal cavalry attacked Allen's rearguard. (Just where this Union force came from is hard to say. More than likely the Yankees had captured Florence after Allen left, and ferried themselves over.) The rear ranks fired a volley that halted the enemy. Captain Lillard ordered his men to form fours, and charge. Major Allen wanted to avoid a battle here, and countermanded the order. Blythe and Reagan had to restrain their men as they instinctively started to follow Lillard's example. Capt. Lillard ordered the color bearer forward twenty paces, and called for volunteers to follow the flag. The horses of Company I were anxiously prancing in preparation of lurching forward, but Allen again asserted his authority. While the men were so obviously torn between answering Lillard's challenge, or obeying their regimental adjutant, the Yankees had unlimbered a two gun battery, and uncorked a round. One shot struck the flag, leaving it shredded on the ground. This event angered the boys. The Rebel Yell sounded as a warning to the infidel, and they burst forth in a fury, racing toward the enemy line. Unnerved by their audacity, the Yankee line wavered, then broke completely. Not knowing the true strength of the enemy, Major Allen again had to halt the charge before they were in too far over their heads. During the night the ladies of Maxton made a new flag for them.

On Feb. 23, 1865 Joe Johnston received word that he was to take command. His infantry was on the road to Rockingham, North Carolina, while Sherman was making for Cheraw, South Carolina. Wheeler's cavalry offered some resistance at Cheraw, while Hardee's men got away over the Pee Dee River. At Cheraw Sherman stopped to dry out, as the army was covered in mud from recent rains. Kilpatrick had occupied Lancaster, and Wheeler was between him and the N. C. border.

Kilpatrick was to remain on Sherman's left flank as he marched north, keeping Hampton and Wheeler away from the main column. In preparation for his move into North Carolina, Kilpatrick began sending out reconnaissance units toward the north and east. On March 1st Wheeler fell upon one of these at Wilson's Store. On the 4th he capture 50 prisoners in a warm fight at Hornsboro, very near the border.

Sherman left Cheraw on March 6th for Fayetteville. Kilpatrick followed on a parallel line toward Rockingham, and crossed the Pee Dee on the same day. Hampton arrived there with Butler's division in time to put up a fight, while Wheeler slashed at his flanks, taking more prisoners (most of Wheeler's command still had not crossed the Pee Dee). Kilpatrick though had long ago adopted Sherman's creed of ignoring such things and driving ahead, whatever the obstacle, and this is what he did. In doing so, he now placed himself between the Rebel cavalry and their own infantry. Kilpatrick actually made contact with Hardee's rearguard as they marched on the road to Fayetteville, and his stragglers became prisoners. This incident exposes the obvious weakness of the Rebel cavalry by now, as it was part of their job to protect the infantry from such events.

Hampton was nearby however, and determined to get back in position. Kilpatrick decided to turn off and intercept Hampton, perhaps dealing him a severe enough blow that would keep him at bay for some time longer. On the night of the 8th, while his units were out trying to locate Hampton's exact location, Kilpatrick himself with his staff, and 16 others as an escort accidentally rode into the middle of a Rebel column near Solemn Grove (to the north of, and about midway between Rockingham and Fayetteville). Unnoticed at first, Kilpatrick and his staff escaped, but the escort was captured. That would not be Kilpatrick's last close call.

The Rebel cavalry still had some bite left in their bark. Unnerved perhaps by his near capture, Kilpatrick returned his men to a more proper position near the road to Fayetteville. On the night of the 9th, he camped on the farm of Charles Monroe. That night Wheeler and Hampton personally reconnoitered Kilpatrick's camp and devised a plan. Colonel McKenzie, and the other commanders were called to a conference. The plan was laid out, and guides were furnished to take each unit to their position. The Rebel cavalry was gathered just a short distance away to the north and west of the Union camp. At dawn Wheeler and Hampton led what Kilpatrick described as “the most formidable cavalry charge I have ever witnessed.” The entire position was overrun. Kilpatrick's headquarters, staff, wagons, and artillery were all captured, but Kilpatrick scampered away on foot, being unable to reach his horse. He ran over to the next camp which was also under attack, but was putting up a fight. Soon the men of this camp were forced to retreat, leaving the entire position in Confederate control. The Union troopers retreated until they were blocked by an impassable swamp.

One of the most incredible cavalry feats in the history of warfare was now within Hampton's grasp. Perhaps only battles such as the fall of Jericho, or San Jacinto, could have rivaled, had the Confederates pressed in for the kill. As it was, it was far more important for the hungry Rebels to stop and gather supplies than to annihilate the enemy. Once the Rebels realized they were in the midst of bountiful supplies, they began grabbing everything they could carry, and no amount of exhortation from Hampton or Wheeler made any difference.

However, Kilpatrick's narrow escape was also due to some ineffective scouting of the terrain. For instance, unknown to McKenzie, there was a swamp between where his regiment was posted by his guide, and the Union camp. At the signal, the 5th charged, but came to a screeching halt in the muck and mire of boggy ground. Much time was lost trying to negotiate this unforeseen obstacle.

While the Confederates were busy raiding their camp, Kilpatrick rallied his troops for a countercharge. The Rebel troopers were now jaded by their booty, and did not defend their position as stoutly as they might have. The camp, his artillery, and many of the prisoners were recaptured. Except for an embarrassment to his reputation, the day was saved.

The attack at Monroe's Crossroads was evidently planned to be the “coup de grace” for Kilpatrick, as all the Confederate commanders were out front leading their men. The result was that Generals Humes, Hannon, and Hagan were all wounded, as well as every officer in Hagan's brigade. General Allen and Col. Ashby had their horses shot out from under them. Since the initial attack was a surprise, a good portion of this damage was no doubt done in the counterattack. Still, the wounding of so many officers indicates that the fighting was severe, and there would be no more such charges for the Rebels, for the rest of the war.

The march continued. On the 11th Wheeler skirmished with Kilpatrick at Fayetteville where another general, Anderson, was wounded. He crossed the Cape Fear River and burned the bridge behind him. This did not delay Kilpatrick long. The opposing antagonist then skirmished along the road from Fayetteville to Goldsboro every day, several times a day, until the 15th.

On the 15th Kilpatrick again found Hardee a few miles south of Averasboro, only this time Hardee was prepared, and blocking the road. After some spirited skirmishing to determine his strength, Kilpatrick decided to call on the infantry. Wheeler heard the firing and raced to Hardee's side. His troopers were dismounted on Hardee's right, covering the road to Smithfield. At dawn of the 16th, the 20th Corps attacked, but found the Rebels feeling feisty behind breastworks, and were repulsed. Another attack wrestled Hardee and Wheeler out of their first two lines, only to be stopped by determined resistance at a third line. Hardee, with Wheeler's help, held out until nightfall when they slipped away. The spirit with which the Confederates fought at Averasboro was reminiscent of earlier days, and with Joe Johnston back in command there would be one last Rebel yell left in them yet.

Wheeler served as Hardee's rearguard while he made his escape toward Goldsboro. This suited Sherman just fine, as he was planning to trap the Confederates there between himself and Schofield's Corps moving inland from Wilmington (captured Feb. 21st). What he didn't know was that Hardee's stand at Averasboro was buying time for Johnston to collect troops and put into motion part of his own plan. One part-which was actually Bragg's suggestion-was to strike at Schofield's column with Hoke's Division of South Carolinians newly arrived from Lee's army, and Lee's and Stewart's men from the Army of Tennessee. The other part was to then turn these troops on one of Sherman's separated wings. All this with the hope of keeping Sherman and Schofield apart so that R. E. Lee could slip away from Grant and join Johnston in North Carolina.

The attack on Schofield came as a total shock to the Federals, who had no idea the shattered remnants of Hood's army could possibly be laying an ambush for them. Schofield's column recoiled from the shock and dug in for what they thought would be more attacks. Instead, Bragg burned the bridges, loaded his men on rail cars, and sent them to Johnston. For his part, Johnston was still unsure of whether to defend Goldsboro or Raleigh. So he had the train disembark at Smithfield, half way in between. There he waited, and watched for one of Sherman's unsuspecting wings to come near.

As he hoped, Sherman's two wings turned east after Averasboro, toward Goldsboro, and were separated from each other by a days march over muddy terrain. The left wing under Slocum would come right through Bentonville. Johnston concentrated his army on Slocum's front and left flank. Hampton's cavalry was to skirmish with Slocum's lead units so as to convince him the Rebels were in his front. Bragg with Hoke's Division was placed firmly across Slocum's route. The Tennesseans he just brought from the fight against Schofield were hiding in the underbrush parallel to the road. Hardee and Wheeler were supposed to move up on the right, alongside of this hidden line. Hoke was to deliver a blow that would cause the Union column to bunch up-offering more victims-and the hidden line would swing down on their flank, squeezing them against Hoke like the jaws of a vice.

The plan was good. The troops were pumped for it. There was just one problem: the same terrain that kept Sherman's wings apart also kept Johnston's troops from getting into their proper position. Hardee had been given an erroneous route to his position; one that was twice as long. He therefore did not arrive in time to add his weight to what was otherwise a well-sprung trap. This weaker version of Johnston's plan was not able to deliver the crushing blow that was necessary for success.

Wheeler was trying to make his way to the right of Hardee. He was to charge in on the enemy's rear, adding his own weight to the jaws of death, and prevent them from escaping. Unfortunately, his route led him across some streams that were barely fordable after the recent rains, and worse yet, he ran into elements of both Kilpatrick's cavalry and the 20th Corps. Slocum's wing by itself was larger than Johnston's whole army. As the 14th Corps walked into the lion's mouth, the 20th Corps was strung out behind, and farther back than Johnston's flank attack could cover. Like Hardee, Wheeler did not arrive in time to participate in the initial blow.

Having survived the first attack, Slocum now launched his own attack against Hoke. Knowing their role, Hoke's men received this attack bravely, and held on, though their fate hung in the balance. To relieve him, Johnston ordered Hardee to send one of his divisions to the front. Late, and weakened by almost half of his force, Hardee was nevertheless determined to execute his part of the plan. Around 3 o'clock his line moved out of the bushes and gallantly charged what was now a warned and prepared enemy lining the south side of the road. Men fell in heaps at the first volley, but the Rebels came on, and drove the enemy from their works for a few hundred yards. Their advance had brought them into more undergrowth that disorganized the line, and Hardee had to regroup. With their momentum halted, another Union division came up from the rear and permanently ended any chance of victory. Hardee surely knew this as well, but his men charged again and again anyway, perhaps sensing that this was their last chance to hear the Rebel Yell bellowing through the gloomy pines. The result was predictable, and they knew it.

Wheeler got hung up trying to fight his way over Stone Creek against the back end of Slocumn's column. By the time he was able to make some headway, the firing on his left began to die away. His biggest concern now was that the ford he was using over Stone Creek was getting worse, being eroded by the tramping horses, and he was afraid he might not get everybody over. When he did, the Yanks had fallen back, prepared defensive positions, and were perfectly willing to wait until Howard's two corps came to join the fight. (According to Allen, McKenzie was in charge of Ashby's brigade, and Col. Montgomery was commanding the 5th during the battle of Bentonville. For what reason, I do not know, nor have I confirmed it. I do know from the O.R. that by March 24th Ashby was in command again.)

Soon after Sherman rode away from Slocum that morning, he heard the boom of cannon behind him. He was concerned, but a courier from Slocum assured him that the firing was just Rebel cavalry making themselves a nuisance. That evening however, another messenger arrived with an urgent request from Slocum to bring Howard over, as Jonhston's whole force had fallen on him. This he did at once.

The next day Wheeler was sent around to the left to interfere with Howard's advance. At 11 a.m. he met the first of Howard's units at Cox's Bridge over the Neuse River. By necessity he dismounted his troopers for a more effective defense. If Howard broke through on this line of march, he would be in Hoke's rear, who was still trying to check Slocum while the remainder of the army found a new position away from Howard. Wheeler managed to slow Howard enough so that Hoke could be pulled out of harms way. Falling back, Hoke met Wheeler around sunset still trying to delay Howard. Together they now formed the army's left wing, facing Howard, while Hardee's men held the right facing Slocum. Combined, Johnston's army formed a V covering their only escape route over Mill Creek.

The two wings of Sherman's army converged for the first time since leaving Atlanta, upon the entire Confederate force sent to stop them. There were only two armies left in the Confederacy with any ability to make a difference, and this was one of them, and it was beaten. Yet, there it was, not moving. This made Sherman pause, and think. He was unsure of Johnston's strength, as prisoners represented so many of the regiments he knew well from earlier campaigns. What he didn't know was that these regiments were now no larger than companies. What he also didn't know was that Johnston was bluffing on purpose, hoping to give his medical corps time to evacuate the wounded over the only bridge available.

For all of Sherman's talk of destroying the traitorous South, his behavior here at first appears to be almost gentlemanly, European in its magnanimity. Had he ordered his whole force forward against both wings at once, undoubtedly he would have destroyed the last resistance in North Carolina, and the road to Lee's rear would be wide open. He did not for some of the reasons explained above, but that cannot be the whole truth, for deep down, Sherman dearly wanted to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. He really wanted to reach Virginia, where he firmly believed the war would be won, and he didn't care to fight Johnston along the way-not unless he was forced to. To this end he gave orders to lay off, hoping Johnston would move away, and Sherman could continue his march as before. (He was still desperately wanting to rendezvous with Schofield's corps, and was late doing so.)

Despite the commanding general's wishes, an over eager General Mower, a division commander in Blair's corps of Howard's wing, launched his own attack against the Confederate left, along Mill Creek. This was the part of the line held by Wheeler, and Mower probably sensed the Rebel's weakness there-cavalry in static line, versus infantry. About 4 p.m. Wheeler's left simply gave way. Brave as they were, there was simply no way cavalry could withstand the charge of an entire division who had glory on their minds as they raced for the bridge they knew to be Johnston's only escape.

Yet it was because of the fact that Wheeler was a cavalry commander, that he already had a regiment mounted, his “gallant Texas Rangers” as he called them, as a reserve force. This would prove to be fortunate. As Mower's men poured through the opening, Wheeler turned about and fired into their flanks. A regiment of infantry, who had already been posted at the bridge, now added their own fire to the front, causing casualties but not stopping their advance. As in other times of desperation, Wheeler determined to charge in on Mower's left flank. His numbers not being enough for rifle fire to be effective, he hoped the boldness and shock of this maneuver would cause more damage. At the same time the 8th Texas Cavalry burst from their reserve position, vaulting across the open field, and struck the front of Mower's line full force at an oblique angle.

Earlier, when within reach of the bridge, Mower had called for reinforcements-knowing he could not stay in amongst the whole Rebel army-but Sherman declined. Faced with this puzzling rebuke, and a maniacal counterattack, Mower withdrew. Hampton and Hardee, who had been on the scene trying to organize a defense, thought the end was near, but were left giddy after witnessing the Texan's charge. As they rode nearer to the field of battle they came upon a stretcher bearing 16 year-old Willie Hardee, the general's son, wounded in the counter charge. He was not a member of the 8th Texas-nor of any service-until that very morning, when his father finally gave in to his pleading to join. It was his first battle, and his last. Three days later, he succumbed to his wound. (Barrett 339)

That night, in a cold rain that was befitting of the army's mood, the infantry slipped out of their breastworks, and crossed over Mill Creek. As usual, Wheeler's men got the dirty job of staying behind to make sure nobody followed. There was little rest however, as before dawn skirmishers were testing the lines and found only Wheeler's cavalry. Knowing the gig was up Wheeler evacuated the entrenchments, and followed the army across the creek. He didn't go far before he ran into the Confederate army moving sluggishly along the Smithfield road. This was disappointing to Wheeler because it meant that he had to deploy his men for combat to keep the pursuing Federals at bay.

On March 23rd Wheeler moved to screen the front of the army, where Union cavalry was beginning to swarm around their flanks. Ashby was posted along the banks of Moccasin Creek. However, the worst was over for the moment. Sherman's main column moved to, and occupied Goldsboro where he finally met with Schofield's corps, and tons of supplies. Johnston was no longer a concern for Sherman; his eyes were on Lee. In order to prepare for the last leg of his journey to Virginia, Sherman spent several days in Goldsboro rejuvenating his army.

Johnston's ragged army trudged along toward Raleigh, oblivious to any danger that might or might not be around them. Such was never the case for the cavalry. The war was over for all practical purposes. The outcome was decided long before, yet for the cavalry the routine of killing, and taking prisoners rarely abated. Reading the daily reports of how Wheeler's men brought in prisoners by the dozens is misleading, for while these actions may have given some heart to the Rebels, they were inconsequential compared to the 90,000 Sherman now had on hand. This useless practice went on for days, waiting on Sherman to make his next move.

Sometime around the 1st of April, an old issue reared its ugly head. Once again noise was being made about the conduct of Wheeler's men, which was being directed at Wheeler himself. The exact nature, or cause, of these hurtful accusations is not simply ascertained. There were complaints from civilians of their property being confiscated, but the same complaints were being made to Joe Johnston about his infantry. There were questions about their performance in combat of late. More than once Kilpatrick was able to reach the Rebel infantry, and at Bentonville Wheeler didn't appear to carry his share of the fight. After the battle it was his part of the line that gave way before Mower's attack. More than likely these things appeared worse than they were from the distance of Richmond. Then of course, there was the matter of his denying some promotions based on performance. These officers weren't keen on Wheeler. Perhaps officials only heard that Wheeler didn't get along with his officers, without knowing the full truth. Be that as it may, the rumblings reached the rank and file cavalryman.

While near Raleigh the men of Humes' Division-Ashby now commanding while Humes was still recovering-decided they would listen to no more. On April 3rd they worded a formal resolution stating in short that they considered the accusations against General Wheeler to be a reflection of themselves; that the statements were totally false; that no soldiers anywhere had more confidence in their commander than they did in Wheeler; that they were determined to follow him until the end; and finally, they were in a war against a cruel invader. To fight him meant that civilians were bound to suffer, but they never took what they didn't absolutely need. The document was signed by all the officers, and copies sent to Wheeler and the War Department.

There are many examples that could be used to defend Wheeler as an officer, but one in particular is the periodic muster rolls that were used to report a unit's strength. From the time Atlanta was evacuated until the end, the infantry suffered a rate of declining strength far greater than the cavalry. During every retreat, and after each defeat, many men simply melted away (Considering the situation, which was far too dire to explain here, it would be unfair to view these men as weak, or cowards). The problem was naturally at its worst in the Carolinas. Only the stoutest of souls were left for the fight at Bentonville, but afterwards even these were finally heartbroken.

The April 7th returns near Raleigh showed 8,953 infantry , while Humes' Divison alone numbered 2,246 troopers. Allen's division was absent, but his previous return of about 1,600 was probably close enough to estimate Wheeler's corps at around 3,800 effective men. Butler's Division of Hampton's command returned 1,242 effectives, for a grand total of about 5,000 cavalry. This was 35% of Johnston's total force (Hoke's Division did not show a return either, so the infantry was likely higher, but the point is made nonetheless), and far higher than the normal cavalry to infantry ratio.

It can be said that the infantry suffered far more battle casualties, and that having to move by foot took more of a toll on their numbers than riding a horse. There is some truth in this, but the cavalry certainly put in their fair share of miles, and the loss of sleep is as damaging to them as the infantry. The marching itself was damaging to their horses, and when Wheeler's strength was at it's weakest, it was when he was low on mounts, not men. But neither battle damage, nor marching fatigue, alone or together, can fully explain the disparity found in the returns since leaving Atlanta. Rather, Wheeler and his officers should be given some credit for keeping their commands together, and the numbers deny any belief that his men lacked confidence in him. This was proven in the Carolinas, where any lack of confidence would have resulted in a steady disintegration from desertions.

Outside of Raleigh, the opposing cavalry continued their war. Ashby's brigade was attacked one night in its camp. The horses were frightened into a stampede, and there was a general melee of men running about in confusion. McKenzie and Lt. Col. Montgomery managed to rally some of the men for a fight. Some prisoners were taken. In the darkness friend or foe could not be determined, and all were mixed up. Men of the 5th turned to a tactic of calling out for the regiment to form battle line, then yelling `charge!' to a line that didn't exist. Their “boogeyman” tactic worked. The Yankees cleared out to avoid being captured.

While Johnston waited to see when Sherman would march on Raleigh, Lee evacuated his Richmond and Petersburg lines. He wanted to make his way to North Carolina, but every time Grant's army blocked his path south, he had to march farther west. Finally, at Appomattox there was no place left to go that would bring him closer to Johnston. He surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia to Grant on April 9th, 1865.

News of the surrender filtered down to North Carolina, where if the Confederates had anything to fight for, it was to save Lee's army. Now even that was gone. Civil order was replaced by panic, vandalism, and desertion. Shortly after Lee's surrender, about April 10th, Colonel McKenzie was ordered to take 100 men to Greensboro, to serve as Provost Marshall of that town.

For the most part, these things affected the cavalry little. Out on the perimeter, moving constantly, their minds always on their job-it had to be, it meant life or death-they had to keep up the daily skirmishing until a surrender was official. It did greatly affect the infantry, who were not engaged at the time, and had ample time to contemplate their misery. Upon hearing what were rumors to begin with, it was like someone drove a dagger through the heart of a dying man. Men began to disappear over night. Johnston and his officers desperately tried to instill order, and avert panic, though they could only rely on the weak and thin veil of a technically. Lee's surrender did not mean the war was over. True, but, . . .

The truth was harder for some to accept. After Lee pulled his army out from the defense of Richmond, Jefferson Davis fled to Greensboro, North Carolina. On April 12th, as Union troops were advancing on Raleigh, and Hampton and Wheeler fought them out of habit, Johnston met Davis in a rail car. Hoping to convince the President that it was time to obtain the best possible terms, he instead got an ear-load about plans to continue the war. Johnston knew Davis was deluded, but he was a consummate professional, and Davis was still the President.

Johnston returned determined to keep the army together, not to continue the bloodshed, for that was the opposite of what he wanted, but because he knew that was the only way to get the most lenient terms from Sherman (Sherman feared Johnston's army was the most die-hard of secessionist, and would take to the mountains to carry on an unspeakable guerrilla war). To appear defeated-to appear to have accepted the idea of defeat-would give Sherman little incentive to make an offer.

It was about this time, near Raleigh, when some of the men were showing signs of what we know today as battle fatigue. Some were in their fourth year of war, and most were three-year veterans. To put it in layman's terms, they were out of their minds with weariness, hunger, and war. Men who were normally clear thinking under shot and shell began behaving irrationally, becoming excited, and indecisive. These are the signs of the ones who stayed, but others who couldn't take it anymore simply ran away in the night.

Johnston evacuated Raleigh, and retreated toward Durham. The 5th TN was Ashby's rearguard. As they were leaving, men were rolling out hogsheads of tobacco into the streets as a barricade. Some of this was set on fire. After passing through Raleigh, they were attacked. The 5th about-faced, and countercharged, but the retreat continued. At Durham, they saw a scene much the same as that in Raleigh: tobacco all over the streets, some in barrels, some in bales, some loose. Men were leaving the ranks to pick up what they could carry. Their plundering blocked the road for those trying to escape being captured. Hearing that Stoneman's cavalry was advancing from Salisbury in the southwest, Wheeler moved on to a post near Chapel Hill.

Sherman occupied Raleigh, but did not remain long. On the 14th, marching toward Durham, he received the message he had been waiting a long time for; Johnston wanted a truce. Sherman was willing enough, and the two men agreed to meet on the 17th. No doubt Sherman woke up that morning happier than he had been in a long time. On his way to Durham to meet Johnston, he received a telegram informing him that Lincoln was dead, assassinated three days earlier. This news could have easily ruined all of Sherman's hopes for peace. If his soldiers found out, there was be every likelihood they would lose control of their emotions, and seek to exact revenge on Johnston's men. It is much to Sherman's credit that he took pains to keep the news private, until he could talk to Johnston first.

The conversation that day went beyond the surrender of Johnston's army, to the complete cessation of all hostilities between North and South. Neither Johnston, nor Sherman had the authority to do such a thing, but Sherman had the advantage of Grant's precedents, and the ability to confer with his government. Johnston already knew Davis was unreasonably for continuing the war, having left Greensboro in an effort to escape somewhere to do just that. So he knew he was the only person on the scene who could speak for peace.

The meeting between Johnston and Sherman was not something that could be kept secret. Rumors flew through the ranks. Each man, commander, unit, began making their own plans for how to react when the news became official. For Johnston's part, he tried to emphasize that their talks were negotiations only, and that there was no agreement. He did this more as an effort to keep some control over his men.

At Greensboro, McKenzie had heard the rumors. Twenty-five of his men there deserted when they heard General Harrison was taking his men to Texas. Everyone around him was behaving as if the deal was done, yet not having heard any official news from his superiors made him nervous. On April 20th, he frantically sent a note to Colonel Ashby demanding to know what was going on.

The 5th Tennessee Cavalry was transferred to Charlotte, North Carolina, where they reunited with their long time commander, Colonel George W. McKenzie. On April 26th the terms of surrender were read to the men. Their last payroll, one dollar and seventeen cents, was distributed. They had to wait a few days while the Federals prepared to administer their parole.

In all, the 5th Tennessee contained 259 men on the last muster roll, but 12 of these men were away with other commands, and allowed to surrender where they were. Four more men were still in hospital recovering from wounds received at the Bentonville fight. Captain Gormley's Company K was detached from the 5th long before the Georgia Campaign as an Escort Company for Generals Kirby Smith and Simon Buckner, and never fought with the 5th from that moment.

They stayed at this camp for four more days. On May 3rd they were given their parole. Enough rations, and corn for their horses, were distributed to get them to Sweetwater, Tennessee, where they would receive more rations. The next morning, May 4th, they marched as a regiment toward Asheville, North Carolina. Leaving Asheville, they entered the Smoky Mountains. This was probably along the same route as Hwy 40 today. Some where in one of the mountain gaps they were confronted by one Lt. Col. George W. Kirk, of the Union 3rd North Carolina Mounted Infantry. This man behaved as if the war was not over. McKenzie showed him their parole papers. Kirk then demanded that the officers turn over their side arms and all the horses. This was a violation of the Terms of Surrender, which allowed the officers their weapons, and all men were allowed to keep private property. In the Confederate cavalry, horses were their private property. The act amounted to robbery.

While Kirk and McKenzie were having this discussion, some of Kirk's men began harassing the ex-Rebels by riding in and pulling their hats down over their eyes. Captain Lillard, being the hot blooded man he was, demanded that they stop. When they didn't, Lillard gave the order for Co. I to form line of battle. Only two of his officers had weapons. At this point, McKenzie realized Kirk was going to ignore legalities, and he ordered all armed officers to the front. Kirk was told to move aside, or they would blast their way through. Their last show of fight worked, and they were allowed to move on.

It was true that all the Union commanders in this area were ordered to prevent non-paroled Confederates from escaping west or south. President Davis and his entourage, General Braxton Bragg, General Wheeler, and many other cavalry units did not surrender, and were trying to escape to Texas or Mexico. This might have been an excused for Kirk, but there is evidence that he was fully aware of the surrender, and when paroles were presented, that should have ended the matter.

It turns out that while Lt. Col. Kirk was a bona fide Union cavalry officer, he was a renegade, prone to being as much trouble to the North as the South. His men were not trusted with regular campaigning, and spent most of their time in East Tennessee and Western North Carolina, where Union sentiment was already strong. There in these mountains, he was more or less out of effective control of his superiors. In fact, Kirk was not the only Union commander with that status. This fact was acknowledged by the District Division Commander, William J. Palmer, when on May 12th he wrote that Col. Kirk should be, “. . . recalled to East Tennessee to prevent his men from pillaging and committing excesses now that hostilities have ceased.” (O. R.) He went on in the same message to say, “The reason I recommend that Brown's and Miller's brigades be immediately recalled to East Tennessee is because their officers for the most part have lost all control over their men. A large number of the men and some of the officers devote themselves exclusively to pillaging and destroying property.” (O.R.)

After overcoming the confrontation with Kirk, the 5th passed out of the mountains and down the valley to Maryville, Tennessee, about 10 miles south of Knoxville. From there they moved to Big Piney. By now their rations had run out. McKenzie sent Major Allen and Pvt. James M. Thompson ahead to Sweetwater to procure the rations that were promised back in North Carolina. On their arrival at Sweetwater, these two men were arrested, and sent to Knoxville. Authorities in Knoxville recognized the mistake and released them.

By the time they reached Sweetwater there were only 5 companies left. (Allen) Presumably the others had scattered as they neared their homes, making their own way. With the last issue of rations this now began in earnest. From here, home was not far away for most, but they often found what they returned to was not the home they left. In their long absence, and under Union occupation, the homes of Confederate soldiers were subject to abuse by soldiers and citizens alike. Animosity was so intense that many were forced to leave their ancestral homes, and move farther west where sympathies were more in tune with their own. Thus ends this history of McKenzie's 5th Tennessee Cavalry, Confederate States of America.